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 Abstract 
This thesis seeks to find out how NATO military interventions in Kosovo, Libya 
and Afghanistan have negatively affected relations with Russia. In order to achieve the aim 
and hypothesis of the study, the critical geopolitical approach is chosen as a theoretical 
framework. 
A schematic critical geopolitics conceptualization of Gearóid Ó. Tuathail is used as 
the method of research. This thesis mostly pays attention to three essential parts of the 
critical geopolitics: “formal geopolitics” (analyses of think tanks, specialists, etc.), 
“practical geopolitics” (the decisions of policy makers, official statements, documents, 
strategies and speeches) and “popular geopolitics” (the discourse of the media and 
surveys). The combination of these three elements allows determining the certain NATO’s 
and Russian geopolitical discourses towards crises in Kosovo, Libya and Afghanistan. With 
regard to evidences of crises, NATO’s and Russian geopolitical discourses are assessed 
from very positive, positive, neutral, to negative and very negative. It provides an 
opportunity to see how both sides have scripted these crises and how in long terms 
NATO’s military interventions in Kosovo, Libya and Afghanistan have influenced relations 
with Russia in international order. 
Moreover, descriptive method, discourse analysis and a comparative approach are 
used to scrutinize Russian and NATO’s geopolitical discourses towards crises. The 
analyses of NATO’s and Russian geopolitical discourses show that the hypothesis different 
NATO and Russian geopolitical discourses towards crises in Kosovo, Libya and 
Afghanistan have led to reciprocal accruing disagreements is only partly correct. The 
crisis of Kosovo in 2008 marks the end of the Russian flexible policy towards NATO and 
marks a new beginning of a permanently hostile geopolitical discourse against NATO in 
Europe. NATO military interventions in Kosovo, Libya and Afghanistan have negatively 
affected relations with Russia mostly in Europe. Mutual cooperation and diplomatic 
disputes towards crises in Libya and Afghanistan are minor in comparison with the NATO-
Russian relations in the European continent. Consequently, Russia concentrates most of its 
attention to the geopolitical tradition towards Europe.  
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 Introduction 
We [NATO member states] are confronted with a new, radically altered, strategic 
environment. Terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and "failed states" all confront us 
with challenges that are different from anything we have witnessed in the past – Jaap de 
Hoop Scheffer, the NATO Secretary General (2004). 
After the Cold War new geopolitical ideas started to appear in academic discourse. 
Classical and Modern geopolitics are no longer adequate to explain the changes and 
transformations of the World since the 1990s. Geography as a fundamental factor of 
geopolitics lost its significance. Countries with the same ideologies and values started to 
(re)unite and (re)establish regional or even global organizations and alliances. In 1949 
NATO was established as a military defense alliance which unified western countries 
against the Soviet menace. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the external threat of 
NATO also disappeared. Consequently, NATO had to search for a new vision.  
During the post-Cold War period NATO has been transformed from a closed 
military alliance to a mobile crisis manager. In the last twenty years NATO has become a 
sui generis Alliance much different from its 1949 design to deter the Soviet threat. 
According to the NATO concept in 2010, the alliance seeks to prevent crises, manage 
conflicts and stabilize post-conflict situations, including by working more closely NATO’s 
international partners, most importantly the United Nations and the European Union.  
After the Cold War NATO’s transformation was significant in several respects, the 
Alliance expanded and incorporated new allies all around Europe; it implemented new 
overseas missions outside its boundaries; it expanded its capabilities from peacekeeping 
and reconstruction missions to humanitarian aid and the fight against piracy and global 
terrorism. In addition, in the last two decades NATO transformed its military and modified 
effectiveness.  
During the Cold War NATO was mostly based on huge conscript armies and air 
power, however, in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries confronted by new 
global challenges the Alliance transformed its military to small highly skilled units, which 
could be rapidly deployed using advanced technologies. Therefore, changes in the 
8 
international system were a fundamental factor that propelled NATO’s new political and 
military developments. Eventually, NATO as a military alliance became a political tool 
which has been used to implement western countries’ policies towards the rest of the world 
after the end of the Cold War. Consequently, NATO’s military missions have interfered in 
Russia’s sphere of influence, which has encouraged a reshaping of Russia’s relations with 
the western military alliance. NATO’s actions challenged Russia to rethink its security 
strategy and modernize its military capabilities.  
Russia’s increasing military capabilities suggest that Russia will oppose future 
NATO expansion sand self-willed military missions. NATO interventions in Kosovo, 
Afghanistan and Libya have challenged Russian foreign and internal affairs. In the current 
multipolar world the relations of NATO and Russia could determine the balance of power 
in Europe, Caucasia, Central-South Asia and in the certain Middle East regions. The 
struggle and resistance of Russia towards NATO leads to new debates, negotiations and 
conflicts which might highly influence regional and even global politics, economies and 
social affairs.  
This research seeks to find out how different crises in Kosovo, Afghanistan and 
Libya were scripted by NATO and Russia. The hypothesis of this research claims that 
different NATO and Russian geopolitical discourses towards crises in Kosovo, Libya and 
Afghanistan have led to reciprocal accruing disagreements. With regard to the hypothesis, 
the aim of the research is to find out how NATO military interventions in Kosovo, Libya 
and Afghanistan have negatively affected relations with Russia. Ultimately, in order to 
achieve the aim of study and hypothesis, the critical geopolitical approach is chosen as a 
theoretical framework. 
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1. Theoretical Overview of the Critical Geopolitics 
The term ‘geopolitics’ has long been used to refer to the study of the geographical 
representations, rhetoric, and practices that underpin world politics.
1
 Nevertheless, with the 
end of the Cold War the world has changed dramatically and has led to the development of 
a more sophisticated geopolitics. In order to understand and actually analyze critical 
geopolitics, comprehension of classical geopolitics is required. Even though critical 
geopolitics is theoretically distinct from classical geopolitics, it is essential to understand 
and pay attention to the evolution of the geopolitical approach. 
1.1. The development of the geopolitical approach 
Geopolitics is a term coined by Rudolf Kjellen, who described geopolitics 
(geopolitik) as the problems and conditions within a state that arise from its geographic 
features.
2
 Throughout most of the twentieth century, geopolitics was limited to a 
geographical perception of the world in which the different political forces and states 
competed with each other. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Englishman H. J. 
Mackinder initially stood among the geopolitics thinkers with his exclusive approach to the 
world. In his work "The Geographical Pivot of History" (1904) he explained and defined 
world regions in detail and introduced the most meaningful of them: The World-Island and 
the Heartland (Appendix Nr. 1).
3
 
Later on, the geopolitics pioneer’s theory was developed and supplemented with 
new ideas by other thinkers. German K Haushofer in his writings presented ideas about 
different pan-regions; American N. J. Spykman analyzed the geopolitical concept of 
Rimland, which later on influenced the U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War; and S. B. 
Cohen treated the world’s geopolitical structure as an evolving system composed of a 
hierarchy of levels—from the geostrategic realm through “the geopolitical region, national 
state and its sub-national units”4.  
                                                          
1
 John Agnew, Geopolitics: Re-visioning World Politics, Routledge; 2 edition (2003), 5 
2
 britannica.com, Encyclopedia Britannica: http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/319825/Rudolf-
Kjellen (accessed Feb 2, 2014). 
3
 H. J. Mackinder, “The Geographical Pivot of History”, The Geographical Journal, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Apr., 
1904), 421-437. 
4
 S.B. Cohen, “Geopolitical realities and United States foreign policy”, Political Geography 22 (2003), 3. 
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Inherently, engagement in geopolitics, from an academic perspective, was reserved 
for the powerful countries of the world. Thus, the opinion was created that 'real' geopolitics 
and geo-strategy can only be carried out by the big states whose primary goal was to bolster 
their territorial positions, spread their influence and pursue territorial expansion. Later, 
expanding the understanding of geopolitics among the major states, the geopolitical 
analysts and their ideas took on an increasingly important role in shaping geopolitical 
codes. In the twentieth century, the expansionist goals of Nazi Germany led to the Second 
World War, after which the geopolitics as academic discipline was seen in a negative light 
among academics. The growing confrontation during the Cold War between the U.S. and 
Soviet Union encouraged the return of geopolitics as a tool in shaping foreign policy. 
Nevertheless, there are other views explaining the development of geopolitics. 
According to John A. Agnew, a political geographer, distinguishes the development of 
geopolitics in three periods: civilizational, naturalized and ideological.
5
 Although Agnew 
reviews geopolitics from this distinct perspective, it still ended with the end of the Cold 
War.  
After the Cold War new geopolitical ideas started to turn up in academic discourse. 
The period after the end of the Cold War has seen a number of other dramatic changes that, 
along with the emergence of worldwide terrorist networks, might seem to challenge the 
continuing utility of geopolitical imagination as a singular guide to practice in world 
politics.
6
 This could also include the deepening cooperation of NATO countries, the 
enlargement of Alliance to the Balkans and east Europe; the menace of failed states, ethnic 
conflicts, spread of the radical Islamism, etc.  
Changes in the international system challenged academics and think tanks to revise 
theories, including the geopolitical approach, and adopt them to the new order. The 
examples of the neo-Eurasianism and neo-Atlanticism illustrate how this has taken place. 
Although the end of the Cold War shaped the global order, certain scholars have still stayed 
with their modern geopolitical ideas and simultaneously opposed the critical approach in 
geopolitics.  
                                                          
5
 John Agnew, Geopolitics: Re-visioning World Politics, Routledge; 2 edition (2003), 86-113. 
6
 Ibid, 1. 
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For instance, neo-Eurasianism and neo-Atlanticism are attempts to revive classical 
geopolitics and explains the confrontation between the West and the rest. Both approaches, 
Neo-Eurasianism and Neo-Atlanticism are endeavors to espouse the importance of political 
geography and mapping. These and most other authors in “neo” approaches give 
themselves up to “neo games,” carried away by the completely erroneous, mystically 
inflated idea of an eternal confrontation between the ‘Ocean’ or ‘Atlantism’ (in modern 
times—the United States and Britain) and the ‘Continent’ or ‘Eurasianism.’7 Neo-
Eurasianism and Neo-Atlanticism became the coin of a few armchair scholars and 
publicists who nostalgically adopted modern geopolitics to the new international system 
after the Cold War. 
Notwithstanding the “neo” approaches, in a table below the scholar of critical 
geopolitics, G. O. Tuathail presents a contrasting vision of the new geopolitical appraoch 
and distinguishes it from modern geopolitics.  
Table Nr. 1: Difference between Modern and Critical geopolitics 
Modern geopolitics Critical geopolitcs 
Cartographic visualizations: maps Telemetric visualizations: GIS 
East/West Jihad, McWord 
Territorial power Telemetric power 
Territorial enemies Deterritorialized dangers 
National sovereignity Globalization 
Hardware ascendant:GPR
8
 Software ascendant: C4I2
9
 
Response to threats: slow and rigid Flexible and rapid response 
Source: G. O. Tuathail and S. Dalby, Rethinking geopolitics, New York, Routledge (2002), 
28 
                                                          
7
 Valerii Senderov, “Neo-Eurasianism: Realities, Dangers, Prospects”, Russian Politics and Law, vol. 47, no. 
1, (January–February 2009), 24 
8
 GPR (Ground-penetrating radar); http://www.3d-radar.com/military/technology-2 (accessed Dec 2, 2013) 
9
C4I2 (Command, Control, Communications Computers, Information and Intelligence) 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1989/CCE.htm (accessed Dec 2, 2013) 
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1.2. The critical geopolitical approach 
In the late 1980s, critical geopolitics appeared as a critique of modern geopolitics. 
However, the key critical geopolitical literature emerged only in the 1990s. The end of 
superpower rivalry, which had shaped the structure of (geo)political thought for over 40 
years, further fueled interest in the spatiality of power in geography and throughout social 
science.
10
 The rethinking of power structure required critical thought that progressively was 
labelled as critical geopolitics.  
According to Gearóid Ó. Tuathail and Simon Dalby, the main scholars of the 
critical geopolitics school, critical geopolitics “has emerged out of the work of a number of 
scholars in the fields of geography and international relations who, over the two last 
decades, have sought to investigate geopolitics as a social, cultural and political practice.”11 
Critical geopolitics is not about ‘the outside’ of the state but about the very construction of 
boundaries of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, ‘here’ and ‘there,’ the ‘domestic’ and the ‘foreign’.12 
For instance, the construction of Russian foreign policy also involves domestic policy, and 
it also reshapes political identity of indigenous and external actors. The same could be said 
about NATO, the fight against global terrorism affects member states and their political 
discourse.  
Furthermore, “the main goal of the critical geopolitical approach is not just to 
characterize the geography of politics, but to analyze the actual politics of the geographical 
specification of politics.”13 In other words, critical geopolitics does not only concentrate on 
the relations only between states, but it also analyzes how particular relations and policies 
were created, approved and implemented.  
John Agnew, another critical geopolitics writer, claims that “critical geopolitics can 
be defined in a broad way as the critical sense that world politics is underpinned by 
assumptions and schemas about the ways in which geographical divisions of the world, 
                                                          
10
 Klaus Dodds, Merje Kuus and Joanne Sharp, The Ashgate Research Companion to Critical Geopolitics, 
Ashgate, (2013), 6 
11
 Gearóid Ó Tuathail and Simon Dalby, Introduction: Rethinking Geopolitics, Routledge; second edition, 
(2002) 2 
12
 Ibid, 4. 
13
 Klaus Dodds, Merje Kuus and Joanne Sharp, 6. 
13 
strategic plans, and global images enter into the making foreign policy”.14 One can 
presuppose that premises and schemas are socially constructed by particular people who 
were influenced by identity, history, geographical position, etc.  
Other academics argue that the basic concept behind critical geopolitics is that 
intellectuals of statecraft construct ideas about places; these ideas have influence and 
reinforce their political behaviors and policy choices.
15
 However, the discourse of 
geopolitics does not belong to exclusively political elites anymore. Critical geopolitics 
broadens the analysis of geopolitics from state actors located in formal institutions (such as 
government ministries, universities or think tanks) to non-state actors.
16
 For instance, 
Russian president Vladimir Putin does not create his own doctrines and strategies, his ideas 
are influenced and shaped by political advisers, policy makers and even by civil society 
groups, insurgencies, NGOs, etc.  
Consequently, discourses are seen to influence the rules and conventions by which 
political behavior is structured, regulated and judged.
17
 The scholars of the critical 
geopolitics school claim that geopolitics must be conceptualized as a form of political 
practice and a discourse. However, many writers limit the critical geopolitical approach 
with particular phrases and ideas. Gearóid Ó. Tuathail and Simon Dalby are some of among 
the few scholars who have fully conceptualized and theorized the critical geopolitical 
approach. Their input to critical geopolitics is significant. They distinguish five 
fundamental arguments of critical geopolitics: 
1. Geopolitics is a much wider cultural phenomenon than is normally defined and 
comprehended by the geopolitical tradition of wise men’s statecraft.  
2. Critical geopolitics bears witness to the irredeemable plurality of space and the 
multiplicity of possible political constructions of space. Thus, it pays particular 
attention to the boundary-drawing practices and performances that characterize 
the everyday life of states. 
                                                          
14
 Klaus Dodds, Merje Kuus and Joanne Sharp, “The Ashgate Research Companion to Critical Geopolitics’, 
in The Origins of Critical Geopolitics, ed. John Agnew, Ashgate, (2013), 19-20. 
15
 Fouberg, Erin H., Alexander B. Murphy, and H. J. de Blij, Human Geography: People, Place, and Culture 
(10 ed.), (2012), 535. 
16
 Klaus Dodds, Merje Kuus and Joanne Sharp, 7. 
17
 Klaus Dodds, Global Geopolitics: A Critical Introduction, Routledge (2004), 31. 
14 
3. Critical geopolitics argues that geopolitics is not a singularity but a plurality. 
Critical geopolitics must be considered as a political activity carried out by a 
range of political actors and not limited to a small group. 
4. Critical geopolitics argues that the practice of studying geopolitics can never be 
politically neutral. It is always influenced by certain values, experiences, etc.  
5. Ultimately, in conceptualizing geopolitics as ‘situated reasoning’ a critical 
perspective also seeks to theorize its broader socio-spatial and techno territorial 
circumstances of development and use. Historically, the question of geopolitics 
has always been the question of states and their societies, technological 
networks and their relationship to territoriality.
18
  
The five arguments above conceptualize the critical geopolitical approach in terms 
of the meaning, space and stability. However, the critical geopolitics argue that these three 
elements are influenced and shaped by other factors, such as certain values, identity, 
history, state apparatus, etc.
19
 Consequently, the knowledge of these features is 
fundamental to the successful operationalization of the state’s/agency’s “the real 
geopolitics.” At this point “the real geopolitics” must be understood as the criticism to the 
classical geopolitics, which, according to the critical geopolitics, is outlived and could not 
explain the contemporary events. However, this research does not seek to find out “the real 
geopolitics” of NATO or Russia. The sub-chapter below will concentrate on the particular 
critical geopolitical aspects that might help to reveal NATO’s and Russian the geopolitical 
discourses towards crises in Kosovo, Libya and Afghanistan.  
1.3. The method of research 
Gearóid Ó. Tuathail provides a schematic critical geopolitics conceptualization 
which is also used as the methodology for this research. The table below presents its key 
features. 
                                                          
18
 Gearóid Ó Tuathail and Simon Dalby, Rethinking Geopolitics, Routledge; second edition (2002) 3-6. 
19
 Ibid, 6 
15 
Table Nr. 2 Geopolitics: A Critical Geopolitics Conzeptualization. 
 
Source: G. O. Tuathail, S. Dalby and P. Routledge, The Geopolitics Reader, Routledge, 
second edition (2006), 8 
Gearóid Ó. Tuathail argues that all states, as recognized territorial units within an 
international system of states, have a geopolitical culture.
20
 Geopolitical culture is mostly 
understood as a state’s/agency’s unique identity, position and influence in world politics. In 
other words, it could be also defined as geopolitical tradition which is one of the 
approaches to the geopolitical culture. States or agencies do not limit themselves only with 
one geopolitical tradition. Regarding the certain characteristics of the state or agency there 
might be even more than one geopolitical tradition. In addition, Gearóid Ó. Tuathail asserts 
that geopolitical culture or tradition is conditioned by a series of factors: 
 A state’s geographical situation; 
 Historical formation and bureaucratic organization; 
 Discourses of national identity; 
 Traditions of theorizing its relationship to wider world; 
 The networks of power that operate within the state.21 
Gearóid Ó. Tuathail distinction once again approves that the geopolitics is more 
than a political geography and mapping. On the one hand, it is a broad and even 
                                                          
20
 G. O. Tuathail, S. Dalby and P. Routledge, The Geopolitics Reader, Routledge; second edition (2006), 7. 
21
 Ibid, 7. 
Geopolitical discourse 
Formal geopolitics Practical geopolitics Popular geopolitics 
Geopolitical Culture 
Tradition nr. 1 Tradition nr. 2 
State structures 
 (History, Geography, Identity, State Apparatus and Power Networks) 
16 
complicated structure of certain elements, but on the other hand, it helps better to 
understand the actions taken by the particular state or agency in the international order.  
For instance, there might be three different geopolitical traditions in the Russian 
Federation: ‘Russia within Europe’, ‘Eurasian theory’, and ‘Russia as a bridge between 
East and West’.22 Every tradition was influenced by particular historical factors, such as 
Slavophilism, or by Western models and institutions, or by particular technological and 
economic developments. Besides, the Russian geopolitical tradition in Europe has been 
influenced by European states and NATO. The Alliance’s actions invoked a particular 
Russian response and counter-reaction which have led to reciprocal accruing disagreements 
and cooperation. Regarding NATO’s past historical events and new global severities, 
geopolitical traditions could be distinguished as ‘Euro-Atlantic collective defence’ and 
‘crisis manager’. It is possible to argue that NATO could be considered as a hybrid, a 
collective security club and an agency for conflict prevention. One the one hand, NATO 
concentrates on the security of Euro-Atlantic space, and on the other hand it seeks to 
expand its capabilities and participate in various operations and missions all around the 
globe. However, as the research suggests later, NATO’s geopolitical tradition “crisis 
manager” was partly unsuccessful due to particular reasons.  
Moving on, the geopolitical tradition finds concrete expression in the form of 
particular geopolitical discourses. Discourses are not merely speech or written statements 
but actually the rules by which verbal speech and written declarations are made 
meaningful.
23
 Moreover, in the critical geopolitics approach discourses are not only 
produced by political elites, but also throughout state-centered society at multiple sites.
24
 
Above, in Table Nr. 2 (see page 15), Gearóid Ó. Tuathail distinguishes critical geopolitics 
discourse into “formal geopolitics”, “practical geopolitics”, and “popular geopolitics”.  
“Formal geopolitics” refers to the experts or the strategic community of the state 
who create political doctrines, strategic studies or specific bureaucratic reports. For 
instance, NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and Allied 
                                                          
22
 G. O. Tuathail, S. Dalby and P. Routledge, The Geopolitics Reader, Routledge; second edition (2006), 8 
23
 Gearóid Ó Tuathail and Simon Dalby, “Geopolitics and discourse: Practical geopolitical reasoning in 
American foreign policy”, Political Geography Vol. 11, No. 2, March 1992, 95. 
24
 G. O. Tuathail, S. Dalby and P. Routledge, 9. 
17 
Command Transformation (ACT) are the key institutions that promote changes by driving, 
facilitating, and advocating continuous improvement of Alliance capabilities to maintain 
and enhance the military relevance and effectiveness of the Alliance.
25
 In Russia, the 
Ministry of Defence and the Security Council are the leading institutions that ensure the 
establishment of particular strategies, doctrines, etc. Undoubtedly, under all these 
institutions there are many committees, working groups, think tanks, and bureaucrats who 
are responsible for the efficient creation and implementation of strategies.  
Sometimes “formal geopolitics” and “practical geopolitics” reproduce each other, 
particularly when politicians are directly involved in the strategy-making. On the other 
hand, “practical geopolitics” is mostly related with the leaders of the state and foreign 
affairs policy makers.
26
 “Practical geopolitics” represents the actual practice of policy that 
is usually expressed by official political speeches or the state’s/agency’s actions. In NATO, 
practical geopolitics is mostly related with the North Atlantic Council (NAC) where 
political decisions are adopted by permanent member states delegations. In comparison 
with Russia, NATO’s “practical geopolitics” requires a consensus among all 
representatives of member states. Consequently, NATO’s political decisions and actions 
(“practical geopolitics”) represent a unilateral position of the entire Alliance. In theory, the 
Russian “practical geopolitics” applies to already mentioned the Security Council, current 
president Vladimir Putin, prime minister Dmitry Medvedev, the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Sergey Lavrov, and other important politicians. However, in the practical way, the Russian 
“practical geopolitics” belongs to the small circle of the decision makers, especially 
including Putin. 
Last but not least, “popular geopolitics” refers to the mass media, state rituals and 
public opinion. Taking into account that NATO is an agency/international actor that unites 
a group of states, thus both Russia and NATO use mass media for core dissemination of 
ideas and propaganda to societies. Similar to mass media, state rituals also shape and 
transform the opinion of people. For instance, NATO represented by the certain media as 
the exclusive club of democratic countries that protects human rights, international law and 
                                                          
25
 NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT) http://www.act.nato.int/mission (accessed Feb 25, 2014.) 
26
 Gearóid Ó Tuathail and Simon Dalby, Rethinking Geopolitics, Routledge; second edition, (2002), 12. 
18 
Russia represented by its media as the counter-balance to the hegemony of the west 
(NATO).  
What is more, Gearóid Ó. Tuathail argues that “not all geopolitical discourses are 
created or treated equally.”27 On the one hand, some geopolitical discourses are produced 
by military or states institutions, military specialists and universities. On the other hand, 
one of the discourses could be also influenced by civil society: NGO’s, think tanks, etc. 
Moreover, journals and newspapers often promote certain geopolitical discourse that only 
serves a political agenda.
28
  
Eventually, all three geopolitical discourses interact and influence each other, thus 
the lines between them could blur. Formal, practical, and popular geopolitics are the 
outcome of the predominated geopolitical cultures and traditions. In comparison with 
Russia as a state actor, NATO is considered as a military alliance, however this research 
seeks to analyze NATO from the different perspective and perception. NATO member 
states represent a certain western culture and traditions, which eventually unite them to the 
unprecedented agency in the international order. Undoubtedly, NATO as an international 
institution/agency depends on its member states and their political decisions, however, on 
the other hand, member states also depends on political and military decisions within 
NATO (for instance, NATO’s article V). This research will analyze NATO as an 
international actor, which has its political decision and strategy makers. The western media, 
as the representative of the “popular geopolitics” will be taken into consideration as the 
“fourth government of NATO”, which monitors, criticizes and even spreads propaganda 
about the NATO’s activities.  
A critical geopolitical approach helps to look at world affairs critically. It provides a 
framework within which indigenous events in one place could be linked to global politics. 
Besides, analyses of the geopolitical discourses could provide an opportunity to predict the 
future direction of regional or world politics. 
Ultimately, this research will mostly pay attention to three essential parts of the 
critical geopolitics: “Formal geopolitics” (analyses of think tanks, specialists, etc.), 
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“practical geopolitics” (the decisions of policy makers, official statements, documents, 
strategies and speeches) and “popular geopolitics” (the discourse of the media and 
surveys). The combination of these three elements will allow determining the certain 
NATO’s and Russian geopolitical discourses towards crises in Kosovo, Libya and 
Afghanistan. With regard to evidences of crises, NATO’s and Russian geopolitical 
discourses will be evaluated from very positive, positive, neutral, to negative and very 
negative. It will provide an opportunity to see how both sides have scripted these crises and 
how in long terms NATO’s military interventions in Kosovo, Libya and Afghanistan have 
influenced relations with Russia and the international order.  
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2. Methodology 
This research is different from other similar works with its exclusive approach to 
NATO and Russian relations which were affected by NATO military interventions in 
Kosovo, Libya and Afghanistan. This research reviews more than a decade which actually 
allows a better look at military operations from a distance. Critical geopolitics theory seeks 
to investigate geopolitics as a cultural, social and political practice. Critical geopolitics 
helps to review not only what is “outside” of actor/state, but what is ‘inside’, the ‘domestic’ 
and the ‘foreign’, ‘there’ and ‘here’.29 Analysis of three different cases gives an opportunity 
to anticipate and indicate how NATO and Russia have scripted these crises and how their 
different geopolitical discourses towards crises have led to reciprocal accruing 
disagreements or cooperation. 
With regard to already mentioned the hypothesis and aim of this research three 
goals are introduced. First of all, the author seeks to conceptualize the critical geopolitical 
theory and relate NATO and Russian positions to it. Secondly, to compare and contrast 
Russian and NATO’s geopolitical discourses towards the Kosovo, Libyan and Afghanistan 
crises and clarify the consequences for the mutual relations and cooperation in the 
international order. Finally, to encapsulate all insights and draw conclusions.  
Additionally, using the critical geopolitical approach this research seeks to answer 
to several research questions: 
 What are NATO and Russian geopolitical discourses towards crises in Kosovo, 
Libya and Afghanistan? 
 How has the NATO military interventions affected relations with Russia in the 
international order after the Cold War? 
In order to satisfy and implement research goals, descriptive method, discourse 
analysis and a comparative approach will be applied. The descriptive method will be used 
in order to present case studies of crises in Kosovo, Libya and Afghanistan. The author 
briefly reviews the development of crises and reasons why NATO intervened to these three 
territories. Moreover, discourse analysis and a comparative approach will be used to 
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scrutinize Russian and NATO’s geopolitical discourses towards crises in Kosovo, Libya 
and Afghanistan after the end of the Cold War. These methods, especially the comparative 
method, provide an opportunity to look better at different perceptions of NATO and Russia. 
In this research the (official) discourse analysis is mostly used to compare and contrast 
different NATO’s and Russian official documents, treaties, agreements, speeches and the 
media reports. Consequently, it allows looking better at different NATO’s and Russian 
perceptions towards crises. The discourse analysis leads to the comparative method 
(broadly used in the section 5.The Interaction of Geopolitical Discourses), which helps to 
investigate changes of NATO’s and Russian geopolitical discourses in times of crises. This 
method eventually provides an opportunity to foresee and indicate facts where, when and, 
especially, how NATO’s military interventions in Kosovo, Libya and Afghanistan 
influenced relations with Russia.  
Furthermore, in the theoretical part, fundamental ideas of critical geopolitics will be 
reviewed and conceptualized. The books listed were used as the main sources of the critical 
geopolitics: Gearóid Ó Tuathail and Simon Dalby, Introduction: Rethinking Geopolitics, 
Routledge; second edition, (2002), G. O. Tuathail, S. Dalby and P. Routledge, The 
Geopolitics Reader, Routledge, second edition (2006), John Agnew, Geopolitics: Re-
visioning World Politics, Routledge; 2nd edition, (2003) and Klaus Dodds, Merje Kuus and 
Joanne Sharp, The Ashgate Research Companion to Critical Geopolitics, Ashgate (2013). 
Simon Dalby and especially Gearóid Ó Tuathail are the main theorists of critical 
geopolitics that are used in this research. Interpretations and additional ideas about Gearóid 
Ó Tuathail’s perception about critical geopolitics are reviewed in other writings, which are 
already mentioned above. Undoubtedly, there are other authors, such as Fouberg, Erin H., 
Alexander B. Murphy, H. J. de Blij, John Agnew and Klaus Dodds, who study critical 
geopolitics, however, their writings are minor in comparison to the volume and precise 
conceptualization of the critical geopolitics written by Gearóid Ó Tuathail and Simon 
Dalby.  
In the empirical part, with regard to “formal geopolitics,” different books, articles 
and journals will be used in order to indicate the specific features of NATO and Russia. In 
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the section about the Kosovo crisis, Albrecht Shnabel and Ramesh Thakur, Kosovo and the 
challenge of humanitarian intervention: selective indignation, collective action, and 
international citizenship, United Nations University Press, (2000); John Norris, Collision 
course: NATO, Russia, and Kosovo, Praeger Press, (2005); Дмитрий Тренин and 
Екатерина Степанова, Косово: международные аспекты кризиса, Moscow Carnegie 
Center, (1999) and Tim Judah, Kosovo: what everyone needs to know, Oxford University 
Press, USA (2008) are used. 
In the section about the Afghanistan crisis the research has relied mainly on M. J. 
Williams, The Good War: NATO and the liberal conscience in Afghanistan, Palgrave 
Macmillan, (2011); Oksana Antonenko, “The Central Asian states and Russia”, in 
Afghanistan to 2015 and beyond, ed. Toby Dodge and Nicholas Redman, Routledge, 
(2011) and Sten Rynning, NATO in Afghanistan: The Liberal Disconnect, Stanford 
Security Studies (2012) and various journal articles.  
Furthermore, Alison Pargeter, Libya: The Rise and Fall of Qaddafi, Yale University 
Press, (2012); Campbell Horace, Global NATO and the Catastrophic Failure in Libya, 
Monthly Review Press, (2013); Geir Ulfstein And Hege Føsund Christiansen, “The 
Legality Of The NATO Bombing In Libya”, ICLQ vol. 62, (2013) and other books and 
articles are used to analyze the Libyan crisis.  
Analyses and reviews of these writings will provide a possibility to understand 
better the “formal geopolitics” (think tanks, specialists, etc.) of NATO and Russia. Using 
already discussed methods, all facts and information will be compared and contrasted to 
each other.  
Furthermore, in order to identify the Russian and NATO’s “practical geopolitics.” 
the decisions of policy makers, official statements, documents, strategies and speeches are 
compared and contrasted to each other. Legal documents such as NATO strategic concepts, 
Russian foreign and military strategies, UN Security Council resolutions, Prague Summit 
declaration and similar reports are used. Moreover, official speeches of Russian and NATO 
political leaders are taken from Ministry of the Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 
and NATO official website.  
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Last but not least, “popular geopolitics” of NATO and Russia are scrutinized and 
compared regarding the discourse of the media and surveys. Major the Western and  the 
Russian media and the social media will be reviewed and compared. Regarding the 
circulation and popularity of the media, the news coverage from BBC, CNN, der Spiegel, 
Reuters, The New York Times, Izvestia, Kommersant, Lenta and Pravda newspapers are 
analyzed. Moreover, several surveys such as Financial Times/Harris March-April 2011 and 
The German Marshall Fund of the United States, “Transatlantic Trends survey 2013” about public 
opinion towards the crises are used in order to supplement and justify arguments. The timeframe 
of the media and surveys are monitored from 1999 to March 2014. 
Additionally, NATO’s and Russian “formal geopolitics”, “practical geopolitics” and 
“popular geopolitics” are compared and contrasted to each other. All collected data and 
information are scrutinized and compared with other opinions, academic discourses, books 
and journals. Regarding the case study of this research, different sources are used to 
achieve that. Martin A. Smith, “NATO-Russia relations: will the future resemble the 
past?”, in NATO in search of a vision, ed. Gulner Aybet and Rebecca R Moore, 
Georgetown University Press, (2010); Oksana Antonenko, “The Central Asian states and 
Russia”, in Afghanistan to 2015 and beyond, ed. Toby Dodge and Nicholas Redman, 
Routledge, (2011); Eugeniusz Smolar, “Transatlantic relations and NATO”, European 
View 10:127–135, Centre for European Studies (2011); Andreas Behnke, NATO's Security 
Discourse after the Cold War: Representing the West, Routledge; 1st edition, (2012), and 
other books and articles have been employed in reference to the NATO-Russian relations 
after the Cold War. 
Furthermore, the qualitative research approach has been used in order to interview 
officials, authorities and scholars. However, a structured interview method is not a 
fundamental part of this methodology, it is only used to get additional information and 
receive experts’ opinions which are not available in the literature. The interviewees were 
selected regarding research problems. The author of this research sought to receive reliable 
interviews from people who are aware of NATO and Russian geopolitical discourses. Even 
though there were ten requests sent to the interviewees, only four of them were successful. 
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Some of them could not attend an interview due to technical issues, the rest simply 
provided valuable sources which helped in this research. Nevertheless, the author believes 
that interviews received via skype or during live meetings are still beneficial. The 
composition of the interviewees is as follows: 
1. The Senior Counselor Denis Gonchar from the Russian Embassy in Washington 
D.C. (interview was taken on February 13, 2014). 
2. Dr. Ieva Karpaviciute, a special Lithuanian attaché to NATO HQ (interview was 
taken via skype on February 28, 2014). 
3. The senior expert Vadim Volovoj from the Centre of Geopolitical Studies 
(interview was taken via skype on March 2, 2014). 
4. Professor Boris Barkanov, Postdoctoral Research Fellow at Davis Center for 
Russian and Eurasian Studies at Harvard University (interview taken on March 5, 2014). 
During interviews the main goal was to question and find out: 
 How NATO military interventions in Kosovo, Libya and Afghanistan 
influenced relations with Russia. 
 How Russia scripted these crises in the Post Cold War era. 
 And as the result of that, what Russia’s perception towards the international 
order was. 
Finally, this research consists of five chapters. The work begins with the 
introduction. In the first chapter the critical geopolitical theory is conceptualized and 
reviewed how it is essential for NATO and Russia. In the second, methodology of the 
research is scrutinized and presented. In the third chapter, cases of Kosovo, Libya and 
Afghanistan are briefly presented and explained. In the fourth chapter, NATO and Russian 
geopolitical discourses are compared and contrasted to each other. In the last chapter the 
interaction of geopolitical discourses are encapsulated and impact on relations with Russia 
is presented. The research is finished with conclusions, bibliography and appendix. 
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3. Case Studies in Times of Crisis 
During the Post Cold War era NATO emerged as an active crises manger all around 
the globe. In the last two decades NATO has been participating in various missions and 
operations: Humanitarian support after the hurricane Katrina in the US and earthquake in 
Pakistan; peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia; Counter-piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa; 
Monitoring the Mediterranean Sea; Supporting the African Union (AU) in its peacekeeping 
missions on the African continent; and ultimately, the military campaigns in Kosovo, 
Afghanistan and Libya.  
The last three military operations appear as the most fundamental ones due to the 
significant amount of participating NATO member states and partners, the use of resources 
and the duration of time. Besides, NATO military interventions in Kosovo, Libya and 
Afghanistan influenced regional politics, economies and relations with strategic partners, 
including Russia. Consequently, this case study will concentrate only on the analyses of 
three NATO military operations outside its boundaries and contrast an impact on relations 
with Russia. Due to the long research timeframe, crises in Kosovo and Afghanistan are 
divided into two parts – the beginning of the conflicts and the final stages of them. The sub-
chapters below provide a brief description of crises and reasons of NATO military 
operations. 
3.1. Kosovo 
Since the beginning of the twentieth century, Kosovo has been one of the most 
explosive conflict zones in the European continent.
30
 With the decline of Ottoman Empire 
in the beginning of the twentieth century, the Balkan states became the geopolitical zone, 
where the western powers and Russia were constantly rivaling against each other and trying 
to strengthen their influence. Besides, disputes among Albanians and Serbs stretch back 
centuries. In 1974 under the Yugoslavian constitution, Kosovo gained autonomy within the 
Serbian territory. Nevertheless, the relations between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo 
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continued to erode with the rise of Slobodan Milosevic on the Yugoslav political scene.
31
 
In 1991 the disintegration of Yugoslavia enhanced the tension between different parties. 
These pressures also took on religious reflex, as the Serbs were Orthodox Christians and 
Kosovar Albanians were Muslims.
32
 The fundamental problem of the conflict was the 
divergent views of Serbians and Albanians on the legal status of Kosovo. 
During the Yugoslavian disintegration in the 1990s the Serbian police and the 
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) radicalized and constantly escalated the conflict in 
Kosovo region. With the increase of casualties, the international community decided to get 
seriously involved to search for a diplomatic solution. Neither the threat of NATO air 
strikes in the fall of 1998, nor the peace negotiations at Rambouillet in February 1999 
helped to resolve the political gridlock. In the beginning of 1999 renewed clashes between 
Serbian forces and the KLA justified opportunity for NATO forces to launch a military 
campaign called Operation Allied Force (OAF). 
Almost after the decade, on February 17, 2008 Kosovo declared its unilateral 
independence from former Yugoslavia. From the first days it became a controversial topic 
in the international community. On the one hand, the independence of Kosovo is “an 
example of imperial thinking, a manifestation of the policy of diktat and arbitrariness in 
international affairs.”33 The independence of Kosovo was supported only by pro-western 
countries. On the other hand, supporters of Kosovo claim that independence is ‘sui 
generis’, a unique case with its characteristics. Consequently, different geopolitical 
discourses turned out between NATO member states and Russia. 
3.2. Afghanistan 
The first disputes over Afghanistan between western powers and Russia appeared in 
the nineteenth century, when the expansion of the Tsar’s Russia to the Central Asia 
threatened the British Empire and its possession. Eventually, the crisis was solved by 1864 
memorandum, in which both sides agreed that Russia’s advancement into Central Asia 
would be limited and would not interfere with Afghanistan. Later on, in 1919 there were 
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initial attempts to establish the first centralized state of Afghanistan. The early state 
formation in Afghanistan was plagued between constant tensions between various 
indigenous tribal identities of Afghans.
34
 During the Cold War period, Afghanistan became 
a battle arena of proxy war between the U.S. and the USSR. The Soviets were fighting a 
decade long war in Afghanistan, however, due to the American military help to Afghanis, 
the Soviet Union failed to achieve a victory. In 1989 with the withdrawal of the Soviet 
military, internal problems in Afghanistan did not end. In the beginning of the post-Cold 
war era due to the U.S. and international community concentration on the other crises (Iraq, 
Somalia, tension between Pakistan and India, etc.) and not enough attention on Afghanistan 
armed insurgent groups overtook control of the civilian government. Eventually, in the 
period of 1996-2001 a majority of the Afghanistan’s territory was controlled by the 
Taliban. Its controversial leaders emerged as an international threat when they had started 
to call for a global jihad against the U.S. and its allies and initiated acts of terror. 
On September 11, 2001 a terrorist group hosted by Taliban in Afghanistan hijacked 
several planes, which were successfully used as the weapon against U.S. civilians and 
infrastructure. Consequently, for the first time in history, NATO’s Article V was invoked to 
respond to the new menace – terrorism. Afghanistan was recognized as the first potential 
target which had hosted insurgent terrorist groups. Consequently NATO was ready to act 
for the first time outside European continent. 
Thirteen years has already passed since the first invasion to Afghanistan in 2001. 
According to the current agreements, by the end of the year 2014 NATO’s troops have to 
withdraw from Afghanistan‘s territory. The question of the victory against endless 
terrorism is dubious. Accoriding to Stephen M. Walt, a professor from Harward university, 
NATO’s legacy in Afghanistan was just one failed endeavor after another.“35 Until 2005 
NATO successfully restored order in Kabul and its surroundings, and discredited the 
Taliban’s leadership. However, later on the Alliance entered political and strategic 
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gridloack, and lack of future vision raised a rethorical guestion – what to do next? The 
outcome of the current condition of Afghanistan is the consequence of NATO’s strategy of 
the last 7-9 years. NATO and the U.S. failed in terms of stratigical thinking and planning; 
the military restrictions on national contingents certainly limited ISAF’s overall 
capabilities; Afghanistan’s development according the western model failed; the United 
States waged a controversial war in Iraq and redeployed the majority of intelligence and 
military capacities from Afghatanistan; the annual casualties of NATO dramatically 
increased (see Appendix Nr. 7); the Alliance lost the public support due to extented 
military operation and waste of the surplus volume of resources and money; uncertainty of 
the victory.
36
  
3.3. Libya 
Postcolonialism brought changes all around the world including the territory of 
Libya. In 1951 the withdrawal of Italians propelled the Libyan national ambitions which 
were actively supported by western countries, particularly by the U.S. and the U.K. The 
same year the newly installed King Idris Al-Sanussis proclaimed Libya’s independence and 
ultimately the unification of three regions (Tripolitania, Fezzan and Cyrenaica) was 
achieved for the first time in Libyan history. The pro-western monarchy had close ties with 
the U.S. and the United Kingdom which eventually, due to the rivalry with the Soviets, 
established military bases on the territory of Libya. Consequently, the foreign military 
bases provoked anger in the local people and stirred Arab nationalism.
37
 In the 1960s 
Muammar Gaddafi appeared as the vital leader of the nationalists who were seeking 
changes in the ruling elite. Paradoxically, Gaddafi was a military officer and trained at the 
military academy which was mostly operated by the British Forces. With the changes in 
foreign policy and the withdrawal of its troops overseas, the Britain could offer no strong 
military assistance to the Libyan monarchy and eventually in 1969, Libya fell under the 
control of the new leader, Muammar Gaddafi, with minimal bloodshed. 
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By the end of 2010, the world was shocked by the spreading unrests and protests all 
around North Africa and the Middle East. The Libyan population, following the progress in 
Tunisia and Egypt, made their own demands and launched demonstrations against the 
government. Nevertheless, the Gaddafi regime used force and dispersed the crowds which 
suffered injuries and casualties. The clashes between government forces and protestors 
intensified and ultimately led to the open armed conflict – the civil war.  
Regional organizations saw the need for stronger international pressure and by early 
March 2011 the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Organization of Islamic Conference 
endorsed a no-fly zone.
38
 Consequently, on March 17, 2011 with ten votes in favor, none 
against and five abstentions (Germany and the four BRIC countries: Brazil, Russia, India 
and China), the UN SC resolution 1973 was adopted. NATO and the partners were ready to 
act and implement all measures.
39
 
In the following chapter all three cases will be scrutinized and analyzed regarding 
NATO’s and Russian geopolitical discourses. Then all observations will be compared and 
combined to each other. Eventually, it will provide evidences of similar or different 
NATO’s and Russian geopolitical discourses that led to reciprocal accruing disagreements 
or cooperation. 
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4. Geopolitical Discourses during Crises 
4.1. NATO’s geopolitical discourses  
The next three sub-chapters will concentrate to the analyses of NATO’s geopolitical 
discourses in Kosovo, Libya and Afghanistan. “Formal geopolitics” (analyses of think 
tanks, specialists, etc.), “practical geopolitics” (the decisions of policy makers, official 
statements, documents, strategies and speeches) and “popular geopolitics” (the discourse of 
the media and surveys) will be scrutinized and determined.  
4.1.1. The Kosovo crisis 
In 1999, in starting NATO military campaign Operation Allied Force (OAF), the 
allies were united by a shared understanding that NATO was acting in the conformity with 
its liberal democratic values.
40
 The massacres in Srebrenica in 1995 in Bosnia were a 
seminal event and important in changing the course of history in Kosovo. One of the main 
reasons given by Western leaders for the intervention was to prevent a humanitarian 
catastrophe as had occurred in Bosnia.
41
 In addition, NATO believed that military 
intervention, or in other words, air strikes would lead to the negotiations with Milosevic. 
However, Milosevic was hoping for support from the Russian Federation, thus he 
eventually rejected any negotiations with NATO. 
From the early stages of the OAF, NATO declared its official, the well-organized 
“practical and formal geopolitical,” position towards the Kosovo crisis: 
 NATO’s strategy is to halt the atrocities and support the completion of 
negotiations on an interim political settlement for Kosovo; 
 NATO is ready to take whatever measures are necessary; 
 The Council has therefore agreed today that the NATO Secretary General 
may authorize air strikes against targets on Former Republic of Yugoslavia 
(FRY) territory.
 42
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Even though NATO sought a non-violent solution since the beginning of the 
Kosovo crisis, the Alliance member states were ready to implement hard power if the 
negotiations between Serbia and Albanians in Kosovo would have failed. NATO’s “formal 
and practical geopolitical” position was strengthened by certain elements. First of all, 
success in the 1995 Bosnia crisis enhanced NATO’s self-confidence as a crisis manager 
outside the Alliance boundaries. And secondly, the controversial Clinton doctrine 
authorized the use of bombing.
43
 According to the Clinton doctrine, the US and NATO 
forces could go into battle for the principle of morality, human rights, etc. It was criticized 
as a selective policy, however when NATO forces bombed Serbia, the Rwanda and Sudan 
crises were left in political background.  
Nevertheless, on March 23, 1999, the day before the air strikes, NATO issued its 
official and bizarre statement: “NATO's overall political objectives remain to help achieve 
a peaceful solution to the crisis in Kosovo by contributing to the response of the 
international community. Alliance military action is intended to support its political 
aims.”44  
Controversially, NATO had launched a military operation in order to achieve peace 
and stability by force. As the result, FRY blamed NATO for the illegal aggression against a 
sovereign state. The UN found itself sidelined by NATO: “Security Council sanction for 
the bombing was neither sought nor given”.45 On one side of the coin, NATO violated 
international law and without UNSC authorization launched the air strike campaign against 
Serbia, but on the other side, NATO appeared as united and a well-organized western 
alliance which took on the responsibility to stabilize the south-eastern part of Europe. 
Ultimately, the air strikes could also be understood as the point at which NATO “redeemed 
                                                          
43
 Charles Krauthammer, “The Clinton doctrine”, CNN, March 29, 1999 
http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/time/1999/03/29/doctrine.html (accessed March 2,2014). 
44
 Political and Military Objectives of NATO Action with regard to the crisis in Kosovo, March 23, 1999: 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27451.htm?selectedLocale=en (accessed March 2, 2014). 
45
 Albrecht Shnabel and Ramesh Thakur, Kosovo and the challenge of humanitarian intervention: selective 
indignation, collective action, and international citizenship, United Nations University Press (2000), 5. 
32 
its credibility” after a few years of inactivity following the resolution of the conflict in 
Bosnia.
46
 
Furthermore, NATO’s “formal and practical geopolitics” was also promoted by the 
Western media, which represents NATO’s “popular geopolitics” in this research. Since the 
outset of the bombing the media wrote daily about the progress of the military campaign 
against Serbia. Dr. Steven Livingston, an analyst of communication and media, estimated 
that in a two and a half month period (March 23 – June 10, 1999) CNN wrote 2600 stories 
about Kosovo.
47
 At the same time a comparable situation could also be noticed in BBC and 
in Der Spiegel. In two and a half months the Kosovo crisis was covered 1795 and 1012 
times respectively. The huge interest of the media is referred as the “the CNN effect”, 
which impacted policy developments regarding the Kosovo crisis. Furthermore, the global 
media agencies also affected the agenda-setting, or in other terms – the “practical 
geopolitics” of NATO. Emotional reactions towards atrocities and the humanitarian crisis 
in Kosovo influenced the priorities of NATO. After a few weeks of air strikes, the media 
informed the public about the flow of refugees from Kosovo.
48
 Until the media reports, the 
Alliance only concentrated on the outcome of the air strikes. Consequently, NATO’s 
perception of the Kosovo crisis switched from the air strikes campaign to the deployment 
of Kosovo Peacekeeping Force (KFOR) and humanitarian aid.
49
 During the crisis “practical 
geopolitics” appeared as an important factor that shaping the overall NATO’s geopolitical 
discourse. 
Besides, NATO’s intervention in Kosovo led to the establishment of the 
international protectorate in the province.
50
 Eventually, the creation of an independent 
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Kosovo was not seen merely as a buffer zone or outpost of NATO in Balkans, but more an 
ideological struggle between Russia and NATO. However, some argue that during the 
Kosovo crisis, relations between Russia and NATO survived all disputes. Despite distinct 
points of view, communication did not break down. On the contrary, they worked even 
closer together to find common ground.
51
  
In overall, NATO’s geopolitical discourse with regard to Kosovo crisis in 1999 
stayed very positive. “Practical geopolitics” (NATO’s political decisions) were strongly 
supported and partly influenced by the “Popular geopolitics.” Among specialists who 
represent “formal geopolitics,” the 1999 bombings of Kosovo are seen as the most 
successful NATO’s operation after the end of the Cold War. NATO was able to amplify its 
military attacks on Yugoslavia because the Alliance had successfully created the perception 
that it was responding in a measured and proportional way to the events on the ground.
52
 
The bombings helped to propel the negotiations with Milosevic and his regime. The air 
campaign was changed to a ground war because NATO demonstrated that the Alliance 
desired a diplomatic solution.  
In late April 1999, NATO member states presented its new strategic concept 
(changes in the “practical and formal geopolitics”) where lots of attention was paid to “the 
conflicts prevention and crisis management.”53 The Kosovo war had significant impact on 
the creation of the NATO strategy. This document is different from the previous ones with 
its intentions and NATO’s perception on crisis. According to the new strategy NATO “will 
seek, in cooperation with other organizations, to prevent conflict, or, should a crisis arise, 
to contribute to its effective management, consistent with international law, including 
through the possibility of conducting non-Article 5 crisis response operations.”54 It created 
a precedent and left some space for interpretations about non-Artcle-5 crisis response (for 
instance, any new threat could provide grounds for military action by the Alliance’s 
forces). According to the think tank Brookings: “[..] the Alliance should provide a solid 
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foundation for joint military action by allies when and wherever they deem such action to 
be necessary.”55 The success in the Balkans enhanced NATO’s confidence and self-
awareness about the crisis management outside the Alliance borders. Consequently, 
NATO’s geopolitical discourse towards Kosovo and the overall geopolitical tradition of 
“crisis manager” was very positive. 
 
What is more, Operation Allied Force was not limited only with the military strikes. 
After several years the idea of Kosovo independence among NATO members already 
started to appear in 2005. In the year 2006, NATO diplomats were firmly persuaded that 
“while Russia would be uncomfortable with Kosovo's independence they would still go 
with it.”56 In the year 2007, the troika group, which consisted of the US, EU and Russia 
negotiated the future of Kosovo. The unilateral declaration of Kosovo’s independence, 
supported by most NATO countries, came just weeks after the Contact Group report had 
affirmed that there would be no imposed solution.
57
 The gridlock of negotiations between 
different parties was broken by the self-willed western countries’ decision to support 
Kosovo’s intention to become independent. Although Russia protested, NATO was ready 
to implement all financial and political measures to keep Kosovo’s independence secured.  
After the Kosovo war in 1999, air strikes gave way to KFOR ground forces that 
operated as the peacekeepers. Up to 2008 Western countries provided billions of dollars for 
post war recovery and development. In the summer of June 2008, NATO agreed on the 
new KFOR tasks:
 58
 
 Stand-down of the Kosovo Protection Corps; 
 The creation of the Kosovo Security Force. 
It indicated a new stage of Kosovo’s state development, when the Alliance member 
states were ready to help Kosovars to undertake full and independent control of their own 
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sovereign state. NATO’s acceptance of ‘status before standards’ in its dealings with the 
Kosovar leadership has been genuine and in some respects justified.
59
 NATO was hoping 
that with the close assistance and quick democratic development, Kosovo would achieve all 
standards needed for a modern state. NATO continued “to attach great importance to the 
implementation of standards in Kosovo, especially regarding the rule of law, the protection 
of ethnic minorities and communities, as well as the protection of historical and religious 
sites.”60 Truly, it was an exceptional case which was extensively debated within NATO. 
However, the question of the Kosovo sovereignty divided NATO member states 
into two different camps. NATO’s “practical geopolitics” turned out as fragmented and not 
unilateral. The majority of NATO member states approved the confirmation of Kosovo’s 
independence, the rest opposed it. Spain, Slovakia, Romania and Greece still do not 
recognize the status of Kosovo. The main purpose for their reaction is the contemporary 
domestic political and ethnic issues that these countries face. Nevertheless, NATO still 
tried to cooperate with Kosovo as one united Alliance.  
The same as in 1999, “popular geopolitics” played important role establishing a 
certain NATO’s geopolitical discourse. The western media in February 2008 paid exclusive 
attention to the declaration of Kosovo’s independence. During the month of February, BBC 
covered the story of Kosovo 79 times. BBC mostly analyzed the impact of Kosovo’s 
independence on the Balkans region, Russia and NATO.
61
 Even though CNN wrote only 
21 stories about Kosovo in one month, these articles were more positive rather than 
unbiased regarding the question of the independence of Kosovo. Some articles simply 
glorified NATO: “Kosovo's dream to become independent dates back decades, but only 
after NATO intervened militarily almost a decade ago did ethnic Albanians begin to feel 
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their dream could become true.”62 By contrast Der Spiegel mentioned Kosovo’s case 39 
times and stayed more or less impartial the entire time about the reaction of western 
countries, Serbia and Russia.
63
 Journals and newspapers often promoted a certain 
geopolitical discourse that served a political agenda which was more favorable to Kosovo’s 
state rather than to Serbia. The western media and NATO member states became more 
concerned about the consequences of Kosovo’s independence only when they all noticed 
that a similar discourse and strategy was applied by the Russians in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia in the Caucasus.  
Even though Kosovo with a support of western countries successfully declared its 
unilateral independence, the entire NATO’s geopolitical discourse could be understood as 
neutral. One the one hand, “popular geopolitics” covered positive news about Kosovo’s 
independence, but on the other hand, “practical geopolitics” was represented as fragmented 
and dispersed. Besides, according to various specialists and academic writings, “formal 
geopolitics” of NATO was dichotomous – with positive and negative aspects. When some 
NATO member states were against the idea of the independence of Kosovo, the US, 
successfully were promoting and lobbying in favor of Kosovo. The similar changes of 
NATO’s geopolitical discourse could be observed in the crisis of Afghanistan. 
4.1.2. Afghanistan in crisis 
In the beginning, the articulation of NATO’s geopolitical discourse on its 
participation campaign in Afghanistan was more negative rather than positive. A few days 
after 9/11, NATO’s press issued a released that said “NATO is not planning the invasion of 
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Afghanistan, or of any other country.”64 At that time, NATO as an institution was not 
effectively able to act and support the US military campaign in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, 
during the first month after the 9/11 events, NATO were ready to define its first role and 
create measures with which it would participate in the new fight against terrorism.
65
 
According to NATO “formal geopolitics” (NATO strategic community and specialists) and 
“practical geopolitics”, Lord Robertson, the NATO Secretary General, NATO agreed to:  
 Enhance intelligence sharing and co-operation; 
 Provide assistance to Allies and other states which are or may be subject to 
increased terrorist threats; 
 Enhance the security for the U.S. and allied facilities; 
 Backfill selected Allied assets in NATO’s area of responsibility that are 
required to directly support operations against terrorism; 
 Provide blanket overflight clearances for the United States and other Allies’ 
aircraft; 
 Provide access for the United States and other Allies to ports and airfields on the 
territory of NATO nations for operations against terrorism; 
 To deploy NATO’s Standing Naval Forces to the Eastern Mediterranean; 
 To deploy the NATO AWACS.66 
Since 9/11, NATO has endorsed a whole package of initiatives and measures. 
NATO actively supported the U.S. military campaign – Operation Enduring Freedom. A 
greater role of the Alliance was set up only in 2003 when NATO became the official lead 
organization behind ISAF.
67
 Already in 2002 during the Prague summit NATO member 
states agreed to “assist the Afghan government in restoring security in Kabul and its 
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surroundings.”68 Based on the Bonn Agreements and the Prague summit NATO was ready 
to secure and stabilize Afghanistan with close support for the indigenous government, and 
ensure safety for the multi-ethnic society. Notwithstanding, the mission’s activities were 
geographically limited to the security of Afghanistan’s capital and its surrounding area. In 
2004 the tasks of the NATO expanded and by then the Alliance started to “assist the central 
Afghan government in confronting domestic challenges such as narco-trafficking, 
insurgents and militias.”69 Until 2005 NATO’s performance in Kabul and its surroundings 
was successful and effective. NATO member states pushed the Taliban out of the strategic 
areas, an indigenous government was secured and ISAF’s casualties exceeded no more than 
seventy per year (many of them died due to non-violent conditions).
70
 Due to its successful 
performance and well organized “formal and practical geopolitics” work, the Alliance also 
had support from the mass media, or in other terms, the “popular geopolitics.” 
From the beginning, the “popular geopolitics” played a fundamental role reflecting 
the U.S. and its Allies campaign in Afghanistan and shaping societies’ perception related to 
the war against terrorism. This can be illustrated by an analysis of the quantity of western 
media’s articles which were based on ‘terrorism’ or on ‘terrorism in Afghanistan’ (see 
Table Nr. 3). For instance, three months after the 9/11 events BBC news wrote only 98 
stories about terrorism in Afghanistan and 2016 news about terrorism itself. Similarly, the 
German newspaper Der Spiegel, in the same period wrote 322 stories about terrorism and 
only 15 articles about terrorism in Afghanistan. After the tragic events in New York, one of 
the main newspapers in the U.S., The New York Times wrote a record amount of news 
about terrorism – 2420 times, and as the offset, only 908 stories about Afghanistan’s 
terrorism.  
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Table Nr. 3 The western media`s coverage of a ‘terrorism’ and the ‘terrorism in 
Afghanistan’ 
 
11/09/2001-11/12/2001 11/09/2002-11/12/2002 
‘terrorism’ 
‘terrorism in 
Afghanistan’ 
‘terrorism’ 
‘terrorism in 
Afghanistan’ 
BBC 2016 98 701 8 
Der Spiegel 322 15 165 2 
The NY Times 2420 908 602 96 
Source: made by the author regarding the data of the news 
The September 11 events changed the way Americans and Europeans viewed the 
world. In Table Nr. 3 the given data of the same period, but one year later, substantiates 
that attention to terrorism which was originally coming from Afghanistan dramatically 
dropped. However, the media still continued publishing a volume of articles about 
terrorism itself. The mass paranoia towards terrorism created a new image of the menace, 
which became the main challenge to western governments. The “practical geopolitics” (the 
policy makers) and “formal geopolitics” (NATO strategic community) faced the pressure 
from “popular geopolitics” (the mass media) and started to initiate NATO’s new 
geopolitical discourse towards terrorism.  
Moreover, the September 11 attacks had significant impact on the institutional 
perspective of NATO in contrast to stability management in 1990s. After 9/11 NATO 
became more concerned about menaces particularly ones aimed at the Alliance. 
Consequently, the Terrorism Threat Intelligence Unit was established which worked at 
NATO HQ in Brussels. In addition, the allies agreed “to implement a series of policies 
aimed at enhancing their collective ability to monitor and act against individuals and 
groups with alleged links to organize crime and terrorist organizations.”71 Consequently, 
after the 9/11 attacks, the new geopolitical tradition “crisis manager” was ultimately 
justified within NATO institutions (“formal geopolitics”), decision makers (“practical 
geopolitics”) and the media (“popular geopolitics”). 
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NATO’s first overseas missions tested its capabilities to deploy military units far 
from its boundaries, verify capacity to stabilize and reconstruct a failed state. The 
successful first few years changed the perception of NATO – the Alliance appeared as the 
global policeman with the United States in front. NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan 
holds broader international implications with regard to the effectiveness of international 
strategies to combat terrorism and insurgency.
72
 Notwithstanding, NATO was not entirely 
able to function without international partners, particularly Russia. 
To sum up, in the first years of the military operation in Afghanistan, NATO’s 
geopolitical discourse could be explained as positive. With the support from the mass 
media, NATO strategy and decisions makers achieved temporary success in Kabul and its 
surroundings. However, from the year 2005 situation started to change and NATO stepped 
to endless war against Taliban and terrorism itself.  
 
After ten years, NATO officially declared that “the transition to full Afghan 
security responsibility is due to be completed at the end of 2014, when ISAF’s mission will 
end.”73 However, at this moment in spring, 2014 NATO is putting a lot of pressure on 
Afghanistan to keep its presence, but the results are still controversial. According to NATO 
Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, “if there is no agreement [between NATO and 
Afghanistan], there will be no NATO troops in Afghanistan after 2014.”74 On the one hand, 
Afghanistan’s society is exhausted after thirteen years of NATO military operations. 
Moreover, according to the UN annual reports, in the previous year the casualties among 
civilians increased 14%.
75
 NATO strategic community and decision makers face a constant 
political, social resistance from Afghan groups and politicians who are also influenced by 
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the upcoming presidential elections in spring 2014. On the other hand, NATO is still 
attempting to sustain its military presence in Afghanistan after 2014. First of all, NATO is 
seeking to secure its successful work on the Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Afghanis 
Training Mission. And secondly, NATO, especially the U.S., wants to keep their military 
bases operating and ensure their presence in Afghanistan to maintain a balance of power in 
the region.  
Within NATO’s “formal” and “practical” geopolitical discourses, the stabilization 
of Afghanistan is both a domestic as well as geopolitical problem.
76
 First of all, the 
previous several years have demonstrated that terrorism is not limited to the boundaries of 
Afghanistan, it has spread and been consolidated in other countries, such as Pakistan. 
Secondly, reaching agreement regarding allies` contributions to the Afghanistan mission 
has become increasingly complicated.
77
 Within NATO allies have disagreed and found 
difficulties in determining each member states’ contribution to the mission. NATO’s 
“formal” and especially “practical” geopolitics could not find consensus with each other. 
Different perceptions of strategic community and decision makers have increased a gap 
within NATO towards the Afghanistan crisis. 
Since 2005, NATO has turned to counterinsurgency to win the hearts and minds of 
the indigenous populations, thus the mission has expanded. NATO’s leadership was too 
focused on liberal convictions in the abstract and too unaware of the mission’s 
consequences.
78
 The divisions between NATO member states have been a fundamental 
factor that impacted NATO’s geopolitical discourse in the mission in Afghanistan. Internal 
disputes and the occasional independent act of some NATO members, particularly the 
United States, upset external actions in Afghanistan and ultimately overrode the principles 
of the Atlantic political leadership. Inefficient unilateral American policy towards 
Afghanistan distracted the whole Alliance’s strategy. Contemporary relations between 
Afghanistan and NATO switched from bad to worse.  
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Excluding Afghanistan’s internal divisions and counterinsurgency, the media, or in 
other terms, “popular geopolitics” is another fundamental factor that has impacted NATO’s 
geopolitical discourse. The early western societies’ enthusiasm was transformed by the 
anxiety and later on, during the economic crisis, deep public disappointment became a 
normal phenomenon. The media is a key factor informing the western population more 
often about the failures in Afghanistan rather than successes. In the last several years the 
fatalities of NATO troops have reached the same amount of casualties as the first eight 
years (2001-2008) of the war (see appendix 7). Furthermore, the media has published 
contemporary interviews with Afghanistan’s president who declares that “the entire NATO 
exercise was one that caused Afghanistan a lot of suffering, a lot of loss of life, and no 
gains.”79 The hostility of Afghanistan’s politicians and society is constantly published in 
various newspapers and mostly it is negative content news rather than positive.
80
  
Some could argue that the media tends to manipulate negative news just in order to 
receive more attention from the daily readers. However, the last two years of the UN 
reports also noted negative developments and confirmed increasing fatalities among 
Afghani civilians.
81
 Undoubtedly, in several aspects Afghanistan made progress by 
improving the education system and national health service, expanding infrastructure and 
roads, but such advances do not represent the overall development of the economic, 
military and political situation. Eventually, regarding the UN reports, the media and other 
reports, the inferences from NATO’s official discourse about the improving conditions and 
representation of the contemporary situation on the ground in Afghanistan are still 
inaccurate or even deceptive.  
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Consequently, a whole NATO’s geopolitical discourse towards crises in 
Afghanistan could be defined as negative. Division within NATO and criticism from the 
media and societies’ skepticism eventually transformed NATO’s positive geopolitical 
discourse in the first years of the military campaign to negative in the last years in 
Afghanistan. According to Dr. Ieva Karpaviciute, a special Lithuanian attaché to NATO 
HQ, the military operation in Afghanistan was “the most expansive in terms of lives and 
expanses.”82 It had significant impact on NATO member states, especially their societies, 
which has become tired of long-lasting war and anxious about wasted resources in the 
overseas mission. Political and strategic internal divisions in NATO propose that debates 
about “the global NATO” must be put to the end. In other words, disputes between all three 
different types of geopolitical discourses (formal, practical and popular) suggest that 
NATO geopolitical tradition “crisis manager” is doubtful. It is uncertain when a 
comparable NATO military operation might be organized in another overseas territory. 
Tensions in Mali, Central Africa Republic, and Yemen presuppose the notion that only 
major NATO member states, mostly the U.S., UK and France, might take actions. 
Uncertain victory in Afghanistan left many Alliance member states dubious about their 
successful contribution. The similar situation could be observed during the Libyan crisis in 
2011.  
4.1.3. The Libyan crisis 
In 2011, an application of the UN SC resolution 1973 came only after the Arab 
League had agreed to support a no-fly zone over Libya. According to the resolution, 
paragraph IV, the UN authorizes “to take all necessary measures [...] to protect civilians 
and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including 
Benghazi [...].”83 However, this official document does not include any definitions and 
words related to offensive military actions. On March 19, 2011 when the NATO-led 
coalition started to launch an attack on the Libyan government and military, disputes within 
the international community appeared, revealing that the resolution, especially the phrase 
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“to take all necessary measures,” was interpreted differently by separate countries and 
NATO.  
NATO intervention in Libya, under the mantle of “responsibility to protect,” came 
at a crucial turning point in the history of the world.
84
 The vital aim of NATO was to stop 
the Libyan government from using force against its own people. Others argue that NATO’s 
entry into Libya was the result of “a bloody stalemate” between opposing sides in Libya.85 
The concept of “protecting the Libyan people” was also interpreted differently within 
NATO. First of all, in order to halt the advancing Libyan army the Alliance bombed 
strategic targets, such as military airfields, military bases, and motor pools. NATO’s 
“formal” and “practical” geopolitical discourses towards Libya gradually intensified and 
eventually NATO launched air strikes simultaneously coordinated with the opposition 
troops’ ground attacks. In addition, significant volumes of supply drops supported the 
opposition fighters. Ultimately, Western leaders sought to get rid of the Gaddafi regime and 
replace it with a transitional government.  
According to Ivo H. Daalder, the U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO and, 
James G. Stavridis, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe and Commander of the U.S. 
European Command, “the alliance responded rapidly to a deteriorating situation that 
threatened hundreds of thousands of civilians rebelling against an oppressive regime.”86 
Undoubtedly, the NATO campaign against Gaddafi forces saved thousands of innocent 
civilians and brought temporary security to Libya. Although there were miscalculations in 
the air strikes and casualties among civilians increased, NATO’s “formal and practical” 
geopolitical discourse was aimed to protect civilians, enforce no-fly zone and continue with 
the weapons embargo. Paradoxically, some NATO member states, particularly France, 
were providing weapon supplies to the opposition forces. The Alliance was using double 
standards and instead of being a mediator in the Libyan conflict, it fully supported the 
opposition forces. Nevertheless, this did not limit NATO’s capabilities and eventually, 
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according to NATO’s “practical geopolitical” discourse, Operation Unified Protector in 
Libya showed that: 
NATO’s political unity is improving, more work must be done. NATO allies 
overcame their early differences on Libya and forged a course of action 
acceptable to all. Every ally contributed to the operation through NATO’s 
command structure, and no allies restricted the use of their personnel assigned 
to NATO command centers.
87
 
Notwithstanding the official opinion of NATO, the mission in Libya revealed the 
deficiencies of the Alliance and its strategic concept (2010), when the gap between the 
coalition of the willing (the US, France and the United Kingdom), who always drive 
military campaigns, and the rest of the member states became wider than any time before. 
Operation Unified Protector was not run by "political NATO" (practical geopolitics), but 
rather "command-and-control NATO" (formal geopolitics), where again the coalition of the 
willing was leading the agenda setting and whole military campaign.
88
 The contribution of 
other members was limited due to their lack of military capabilities and NATO member 
states’ internal political decisions to avoid another potential long-lasting war in overseas. If 
in Afghanistan the Alliance was working more or less as one team, then during the Libyan 
crisis NATO appeared fragmented (this later appears in Afghanistan as well, see sub-
chapter “4.1.2. Afghanistan in crisis”). Together with a fragmentation within NATO, the 
geopolitical discourse towards the crisis in Libya and the overall NATO geopolitical 
tradition “crisis manager” decreased dramatically. What is more, Eugeniusz Smolar, a 
senior fellow at the Polish Institute of International Affairs, distinguishes five fundamental 
aspects demonstrating the Alliance’s difference towards the Libyan crisis: 
 France unilaterally recognized the rebels in Benghazi as an alternative 
Libyan government and argued for military intervention in order to support 
them; 
 Germany abstained during the vote in the Security Council, breaking the 
allies’ solidarity and siding with countries such as China and Russia; 
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 France and the UK assumed a leading role by starting a military campaign 
practically on their own without referring the matter; 
 Not just Germany but several other countries, including Poland, which had 
been interventionist until now, refused to participate in any military 
activities.
89
 
Furthermore, analyzing NATO’s “practical geopolitical” discourse, political 
disputes over the Libyan campaign mostly appeared between the US and France, which 
were pushing the American government to contribute to the campaign and help the 
European Allies to deal with the Gaddafi regime. At the same time (2011), NATO was 
simultaneously involved in peace keeping mission in Kosovo and fighting against terrorism 
in Afghanistan, where thousands of NATO forces were still deployed.  
Besides, the same year, the Financial Times and the Harris Data Base did a survey 
in the U.S. and the other Alliance member states regarding the military campaign in Libya. 
In the table below, the survey shows the striking skepticism of NATO member states’ 
public opinion towards the overseas mission. However, even the success in Libya did not 
alter and reshape beliefs of societies. In 2011, mostly all NATO member states were still in 
an economic recession or slowly recovering after the last economic crisis. Skepticism of the 
societies and the neglect of the public opinion prove that NATO’s decision to go against 
Libya was based on a few ambitious Alliance countries (France and the UK) and their 
unilateral political decisions and eventually criticized by “popular geopolitics.” On the one 
hand, though the military operation in Libya was successfully done under the NATO flag, 
future participation in overseas missions as a united Alliance became less likely. On the 
other hand there is no doubt that NATO is a unique military alliance which is capable of 
solving such a crisis as in Libya or implementing UN SC resolutions.  
In overall, NATO’s geopolitical discourse in Libya could be understood as neutral. 
Even though Gaddafi’s regime was changed, internal disputes within NATO and criticism 
from “popular geopolitics” decreased a whole NATO’s geopolitical discourse to neutral – 
neither positive, nor negative. Additionally, the NATO campaign has successfully changed 
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Gaddafi’s dictatorship, but the contemporary situation on the ground in Libya is still 
disturbing. A few years after the start of the revolution, Libya is still writhing in crisis.
90
 
Several months ago, the Special Representative and Head of the UN Support Mission in 
Libya (UNSMIL), Tarek Mitri claimed that the situation in the Libya is extremely 
dangerous.
91
 Hence, competing militias, controversial political reforms, and rivalry 
between the political elites and international corporations are contemporary post-Qaddafi 
Libya. It is doubtful what impact NATO's invasion had, on the one hand it achieved 
temporary goals – it stopped atrocities towards indigenous people, but on the other hand, in 
the longer-term it failed to secure post-Qaddafi Libya. 
Table Nr. 4 Public opinion towards crisis in Libya 
 
Financial Times/Harris March-April 2011 
Support (%) Neither (%) Oppose (%) 
US 32 31 37 
Britain 36 28 36 
France 40 28 32 
Germany 34 27 39 
 
Financial Times/Harris March-April 2011 
Support (%) Neither (%) Oppose (%) 
Italy 29 21 50 
Spain 37 29 34 
Question of the survey: To what extent do you support or oppose the current 
military intervention in Libya? 
Source: Harris Data Base: 
http://www.harrisinteractive.com/vault/HI_UK_Corp_News_FT-Harris-Poll-Apr-2011.pdf 
(accessed March 20, 2014).   
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4.2. Russian geopolitical discourses 
This sub-chapter will concentrate on the analyses of the Russian geopolitical 
discourse towards crises in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Libya. The same method as with 
NATO’s geopolitical discourse will be used. “Formal geopolitics” (analyses of think tanks, 
specialists, etc.), “practical geopolitics” (the decisions of policy makers, official statements, 
documents, strategies and speeches) and “popular geopolitics” (the discourse of the media 
and surveys) will be scrutinized and determined. Besides, all data will be compared and 
contrasted with NATO’s geopolitical discourse.  
4.2.1. The Kosovo crisis 
For the last few centuries Russia has had interests in the Balkans region. However, 
according to Vadim Volovoj, the senior specialist of the Centre of Geopolitical Studies, 
during “Yeltsin’s times Russia was strategically weak and it could not play an important 
role in the international arena”, including the Balkans.92 Russian concerns in the Balkans 
were debated only in the context of establishing a close relationship with the FRY.
93
 The 
Russian Federation believed that keeping close ties with FRY would help to maintain the 
balance of power and prevent the presence of other international actors in the region. 
However, the final outcome was opposite Russian expectations. 
From its inception, Russia’s geopolitical discourse was hostile and critical to 
NATO’s military operation against FRY. This could be linked to Russia’s past experiences 
in Afghanistan and Chechnya (1994-1996) when the application of hard power did not help 
to solve ethnic problems. Additionally, Russia was deeply concerned about the air strikes in 
FRY where Russian business was interrupted. The introduction of the EU embargo on 
“prohibiting the sale and supply of petroleum and petroleum products to the FRY” led to 
Russian financial losses.
94
 Despite these facts Russia still sought to be involved in the 
international decision making which aimed at rebuilding the devastated areas.  
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During 1999 Russia changed its own “practical geopolitical” position at least a few 
times. At that time the Russian President Boris Yeltsin faced a great diplomatic pressure 
from NATO member states, particularly from the U.S. And even though on June 23, 1999 
Russia affirmed its commitment to full implementation of the provisions and goals of the 
UN resolution UNSCR 1244, Russia was still de facto secondary to decision-making.
95
 
After five months NATO and Russian ambassadors met once again and emphasized “their 
commitment to full implementation of the provisions and goals of UNSCR 1244.”96 
Furthermore, both sides also agreed “to cooperate closely in ensuring the protection of 
Kosovo's minorities and the establishment of a multi-ethnic, democratic society.”97 Official 
agreements however did not fully represent the real situation on the ground in Kosovo. 
Russia’s political elite (“practical geopolitics”) and a whole Russian “formal geopolitical” 
position were still overwhelmingly against NATO’s intervention. Although both parties 
agreed that there would be Russian troops present in Kosovo, all of them were “spread 
among 45,000 NATO peacekeepers.”98 After long months of endless negotiations between 
both sides, Russia finally did not even have its own sector in the territory of Kosovo.  
Moreover, all diplomatic agreements, negotiations and NATO military operations 
against Serbia were constantly monitored by the Russian media. To the contrast of the 
NATO “popular geopolitics”, the Russian “popular geopolitics” (the media) appeared 
biased and one-sided in its coverage of the Kosovo events. In an interview, Professor Boris 
Barkanov, a postdoctoral researcher from Harvard University, claimed that during NATO’s 
air strikes campaign “there was a very broad consensus among Russians, both between the 
public and the elite.”99 Western countries, particularly NATO member states, were seen as 
aggressors. The Russian media was one of the main sources for information about the 
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NATO campaign in FRY and a serious generator of the certain Russian geopolitical 
discourse. For instance, in more than two months (March 23 – June 10, 1999) the 
newspaper Kommersant wrote 147 stories about Kosovo. Many of the articles criticized 
NATO for invasion, for its activities supporting KLA, for constantly the increasing number 
of civilian casualties, etc.
100
 In addition, Kommersant stayed positive about Serbia, 
Milosevic and the high morale of the Serbian people.
101
 A similar situation could be 
recognized in another Russian newspaper – Pravda. Even though Pravda wrote less (only 
52 articles in more than two months period), the content was similar. The newspaper was 
more positive about FRY than about NATO.
102
 However, it was not as critical as 
Kommersant. Eventually, the Russian “popular geopolitics” mostly can be characterized as 
an anti-NATO, pro-Russian and pro-Serbian. Consequently, the opinion of the readers was 
gradually influenced by the biased media, which served to the certain Russian geopolitical 
discourse towards the crisis in Kosovo.  
Moreover, in another interview, the senior counselor of the Russian embassy in the 
U.S. Denis Gonchar claimed that “in 1999 the invasion of Kosovo was the biggest violation 
of law. NATO intervention violated international law towards Serbians and after bombing 
Serbia relations between Russia and NATO were frozen.”103 Despite NATO’s decision in 
March 1999 to go ahead with OAF without a UN Security Council resolution, the question 
of acting without UN backing remained controversial within the NATO alliance. On the 
other hand, the Alliance member states knew that in order to avoid Russian opposition in 
UN SC, rapid decision-making was needed. In 1999 the NATO invasion and geopolitical 
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discourse towards the crisis in Kosovo did more damage to relations between NATO and 
Russia than any other event in the 1990s. 
Looking from the general perspective, if NATO’s a whole geopolitical discourse 
was evaluated as very positive, than with regard to the evidences and analyses, the Russian 
geopolitical discourse towards the crisis in Kosovo could be determined as very negative. 
The active involvement of NATO’s “formal and practical geopolitics” led to the limitations 
and hostility of the Russian decision and strategy makers. Even though the Russian 
geopolitical discourse could not respond adequately to the strong NATO’s geopolitical 
discourse, however, the precedent was created, among certain politicians and strategy 
makers NATO was started to be seen as a threat to Russia. Moscow had no way to 
strategically or legally contain NATO actions that it didn’t like. Consequently it created 
discourses of fear and dissent. Russia had serious concerns about NATO’s military 
activities. Russia seemed to consider that there are only two options: either to accept 
NATO’s role or to challenge it.104 Russia has gradually started to increase its focus upon 
Europe and build a strong and self-reliant state. The changes in the Russian geopolitical 
discourse towards the crisis in Kosovo could be also noticed almost after the decade, when 
Kosovo declared its independence in 2008.  
 
Already in February 2007 the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, expressed Russia’s 
importance in European affairs. His controversial speech at the Munich security conference 
emphasized two matters of fundamental importance: Russia sought to play greater role in 
the international arena and secondly, Russia would be pursuing its own independent policy 
regarding its political interest.
105
 In January 2008, just one month before the declaration of 
Kosovo’s independence, Moscow issued a new foreign policy strategy. Relations between 
NATO and Russia were recognized as an equal partnership, based on the international law 
and balance of power – “one's security at the expense of security of the Russian 
                                                          
104
 Albrecht Shnabel and Ramesh Thakur, Kosovo and the challenge of humanitarian intervention: selective 
indignation, collective action, and international citizenship, United Nations University Press (2000), 105 
105
 Oliver Rolofs, ”A Breeze Of Cold War”, MSC, February 2007; Source: 
https://www.securityconference.de/en/about/munich-moments/a-breeze-of-cold-war/ (accessed March 10, 
2014). 
52 
Federation” could not be violated.106 In addition, Russia still “maintains its negative 
attitude towards the expansion of NATO.”107 The active role of NATO towards the 
Kosovo’s independence and ignoring of Serbian interests challenged Russian geopolitical 
discourse towards European affairs. 
Russia saw its multilateral engagement over Kosovo as a strategic action to 
counterbalance and compensate for its weakness vis-a-vis NATO.
108
 Russia complained 
about the violation of Serbian rights, the crimes of KLA and so on. Furthermore, Russia 
was opposed to the Kosovo declaration because the UNSC Resolution 1244 did not justify 
the independence of Kosovo. Later, Russia recognized the failure of troika negotiations, 
and that the unilateral declaration of Kosovo’s independence which was actively supported 
by NATO member states, was in violation of all previous official agreements. The same as 
in 1999, Russia’s opinion was not taken into account – NATO was acting unilaterally. In 
the given interview, the senior specialist from the Center of the Geopolitical Studies 
claimed that “Russia was rather influential in the international arena, but still Russia could 
not allow itself to rival seriously western countries.”109 Nevertheless, Russia was trying to 
show that its geopolitical discourse towards Kosovo’s independence and NATO is rigorous. 
On February 17, 2008 the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared that the 
independence of Kosovo was “violating the sovereignty of the Republic of Serbia, the 
Charter of the United Nations, UNSCR 1244” and other international agreements.110 
Russian officials believed that Kosovo’s independence would be the cause of the regional 
conflicts. Furthermore, Moscow urged the international community to respond to 
separatism in Kosovo and punish everyone connected to it. Consequently, according to the 
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Senior Counselor Denis Gonchar from the Russian Embassy in Washington D.C., the 
Russian Federation still does not recognize Kosovo as an independent state.
111
  
What is more, Russia’s position on Kosovo had already been consistently 
supportive of Serbia, but after January 2008, on the cusp of Kosovo’s declaration of 
independence, Russia tied itself strategically even more closely to Serbia.
112
 However, 
others argue that actually for Russia, Kosovo is on the periphery of its interests. Thus 
Moscow did not adequately responded to Kosovo’s independence.113 Professor Boris 
Barkanov from Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies at Harvard University has a similar 
perspective: the independence of Kosovo did not change Russia’s discourse so much.114 
Nevertheless, one point is clear – Russian “formal and practical discourses” were 
dissatisfied with NATO’s monopolization of the European affairs and its unilateral 
decisions. By the year 2008, the centralization of political power could be noticed in the 
Russian geopolitical discourse towards the crisis in Kosovo. The media, which are a 
fundamental element of “popular geopolitics”, became closely related and even dependent 
on the Kremlin political elite, the “practical geopolitics.” Consequently, the “popular 
geopolitics” was a main distributor and reflector of Moscow’s entire negative geopolitical 
discourse towards Kosovo and the upholder of its independence – the NATO Alliance.  
For instance, the newspaper Kommersant in February 2008 covered 54 stories about 
the independence of Kosovo. Mostly all stories, which were more informative than biased, 
were related to the official reaction of Moscow.
115
 Many articles analyze the strong 
response of the Russian government, the President and diplomats. Kommersant often 
emphasized the active role of President Vladimir Putin, who appears as the leader uniting 
CIS and the symbol of the Russian “practical geopolitics.”116 However, there were also 
other political personalities, Dmitry Rogozin, at that time he was appointed as the Russian 
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Ambassador to NATO, was presented as having a more rigorous personality than Vladimir 
Putin or Dmitry Medvedev. Dmitry Rogozin’s lexicon was shown as rude and strident. He 
blamed NATO for expansionism, imperialism and funding Kosovo’s drug lords.117 If 
outside observers recognized the inactive role of the Russians towards Kosovo’s 
independence, then residents of the Russian Federation were sure their government 
struggled against NATO as Russian media was presenting it in the best possible light.  
As the inverse to Kommersant, Izvestia, the official Russian news agency, during 
the same period covered 160 stories about Kosovo’s independence, which was threefold 
more than Kommersant did. In addition, when Kosovo declared its unilateral independence, 
on the same day Izvestia published 20 stories which were more polemical rather than 
informative news. Izvestia claimed that Kosovo did not have a future, it would not achieve 
full freedom and once Kosovars had the opportunity, thousands of them would flee to 
Western Europe.
118
 Or in another article, Izvestia quoted an “emotional Vladimir Putin, 
who was ashamed of Europeans’ double standards.”119 Izvestia emerges as a more pro-
government and pro-Serbian newspaper rather than merely unbiased media. Consequently, 
the certain agenda of the Russian “popular geopolitics” helped the ruling elite to set a 
particular geopolitical discourse which was nothing more than anti-western.  
Russian politicians, specialists and the mass media intensively debated the 
consequences of Kosovo’s declared independence (with regard to Kosovo’s issues, the 
Russian geopolitical discourse became centralized and simultaneously operationalizing). It 
was undoubtedly clear – Russia was looking for political measures to respond to this 
exceptional crisis. Tim Judah, the Economist expert on the Balkan affairs, believes that it 
“was the time to seek revenge on Western countries for what Russians perceive as their 
humiliation in the 1990s” and for the active unilateral role of NATO in European affairs.120 
NATO certain geopolitical discourse towards the independence of Kosovo, invoked the 
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hostility and changes in the Russian geopolitical discourse in Europe and the Caucasus. 
Moscow’s rejection of Kosovo’s independence is “framed within contested values and 
norms—the most baleful legacy of the disputes nearly a decade earlier during OAF.”121 The 
Kosovo war in 1999 dates the beginning of the Kosovo crisis, and the declaration of 
independence as the end. With almost a decade, NATO-Russia relations towards Kosovo’s 
crisis changed, Russia became more politically independent and hostile towards NATO’s 
unilateral policies and military operations.  
Moreover, the declaration of Kosovo independence divided the international 
community, including NATO itself, and in pro-Russian countries anti-NATO moods start 
rising. Some could argue that Europe is entering into a new Cold War, where the division 
between different NATO’s and Russian geopolitical discourses emerged. Disputes in 
Crimea and later on in Eastern Ukraine prove that Kosovo’s case was a precedent 
interpreted differently by Russian and NATO’s geopolitical discourses. And even though 
NATO’s geopolitical discourse towards the independence of Kosovo was neutral, the entire 
Russian geopolitical discourse turns out as negative. NATO’s strategy and political 
decisions influenced negatively relations with the Russian Federation. Russia’s experience 
of Kosovo has, consequently, reinforced the perception of mistrust towards NATO.
122
 With 
changing the Russian geopolitical discourse, Russia was ready to defend its positions in 
European affairs and oppose the future NATO’s activities in Europe and the Caucasus.  
4.2.2. Afghanistan in crisis 
In February 2000 the new Russian President Vladimir Putin thawed NATO-Russia 
relations which after the Kosovo war in 1999 were frozen for three months. The events of 
September 11 signaled to the Russian politicians and strategic community (practical and 
formal geopolitics) how far terrorism could extend and even threaten such a power as the 
U.S. Additionally, Moscow was deeply concerned about its own separatist regions and 
expanding global terrorism; consequently, it started to cultivate more pragmatic relations 
with NATO and its main contributor – the United States.  
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On September 19, 2001 in an interview with the German ARD Television company, 
Putin strongly emphasized that “the response to the aggression with which the United 
States has been confronted must be prompt.”123 From the outset Russia clearly stated its 
discourse towards the threat of terrorism. In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 events, 
Putin even raised the question of possible Russian membership in NATO.
124
 Moscow was 
ready to cooperate with NATO in all feasible diplomatic and practical measures.  
Besides, the menace of terrorism, drug trafficking was another concern that led to 
Russian cooperation with NATO. At that time Afghanistan was a leading producer of 
poppies used for making heroin and supplied 80% of the global market. In his speech to the 
Security Council of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin emphasized that a fundamental 
task was “connected with the elimination of financial channels for narco-business, which 
can be cut off not only by fighting against criminal elements, but also through the use of a 
whole system of special measures.”125 For years Russia was not able to succeed in fighting 
against illegal drug trafficking. Moscow was sure that cooperation with NATO could solve 
more problems than just terrorism.  
If in 1999 the Russian geopolitical discourse towards the crisis in Kosovo and 
NATO was very negative, then after several years we can observe the significant changes. 
First of all, the general structure of the Russian geopolitical culture (see page 17) was 
shaped by the new state apparatus (new political leaders appeared) and relations with 
neighbors (Russia was still economically and politically weak, thus pragmatism was 
necessary). Secondly, the Russian geopolitical tradition towards Asia was impacted by the 
growing threat of terrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Consequently, these elements 
influenced the Russian geopolitical discourse towards the crisis in Afghanistan. 
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For the next few years NATO-Russian relations in regard to the Afghanistan crisis 
became even tighter. In May 2002 at the Russia-NATO Permanent Joint Council Meeting, 
Russia agreed to “strengthen cooperation through a multi-faceted approach, including joint 
assessment of the terrorist threat to the Euro-Atlantic area, focused on specific threats, for 
example, to Russian and NATO forces, to civilian aircraft, or to critical infrastructure.”126 
After the Rome summit in May 2002 the reciprocal cooperation was improved by the 
creation of the NATO-Russia Council where Russia received co-decision responsibilities: 
“military crisis management, counterterrorism, non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD).”127 In 2003 both sides agreed to deepen cooperation ensuring security 
in Afghanistan and continue ongoing discussions at the NATO-Russia Council. In addition, 
Russia offered “to provide practical support to the NATO-led International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.”128 Regarding the war in Afghanistan, Russia 
mostly contributed to the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan border control, transit routes which 
pass through Russia (see Appendix Nr. 6), and bilateral training on practical aspects of the 
fight against terrorism.  
What is more, Putin’s decision to support NATO in the struggle against terrorism 
and his redefinition of national interests led to an important change in the Russian 
geopolitical discourse.
129
 Cooperation with NATO in dealing with Afghanistan’s problems 
and threat of terrorism allowed to the Russian Federation return to the international arena 
and participate in the decision-making process and implementation. Ultimately, Russia 
normalized its relations with NATO and helped to stabilize Afghanistan. Concerning the 
critical geopolitical approach, such a development of NATO-Russian relations could be 
explained by the geopolitical discourse, which was the same. One could argue that both 
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sides NATO and Russia have scripted the Afghanistan crisis in the same way – positively, 
thus it led to reciprocal cooperation.  
Furthermore, as it was already observed, due to the certain entire Russian 
geopolitical culture, the media that represents the “popular geopolitics” had close nexus 
with the “practical and formal geopolitics.” It could be observed in all cases, especially in 
later ones, when the “practical geopolitics” usurped the “popular geopolitics,” which 
eventually started to serve (but not influence) for the entire geopolitical discourse. As the 
results, the Russian government was also supported by the country’s media which was 
influenced by the 9/11 attacks. Phenomena comparable to the western media could be 
observed in the Russian newspapers as well. NATO’s and the Russian “popular 
geopolitics” were shaped by both the threat of terrorism and the other geopolitical elements 
(practical and formal geopolitics). However, in NATO’s case, the media was not so much 
influential by the “practical geopolitics” as in Russia. 
Nevertheless, the September 11 events fueled debates about terrorism which was 
already in the Russian media’s agenda since the second Chechnya war in late 1999. In a 
three months period (September 11 – December 11, 2001), for instance, the newspaper 
Kommersant published 1000 stories related to terrorism, out of them 323 covered terrorism 
in Afghanistan and it was tenfold more than at the same time one year earlier. Other 
newspapers, particularly those with close tie to the Kremlin, backed up the politicians and 
daily reported their speeches, interviews and decisions regarding terrorism issues. The 
Russian “popular geopolitics” towards the Afghanistan crisis and NATO switched from 
negative post-Kosovo coverage to the positive post-9/11 coverage.
130
 For instance, 
according to the newspaper Lenta, the events of September 11 restored negotiations on the 
establishment of a NATO mission in Moscow.
131
 There were also some articles criticizing 
the U.S. for its strict policy of those ‘who are not with us are against us’ towards the 
Afghanistan crisis.
132
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Nevertheless, several negative reports from the media did not influence Russian 
foreign policy and Moscow decided to join the campaign against the insurgent group in 
Afghanistan. It once again illustrates the “popular geopolitics” dependence on the Russian 
“practical geopolitics,” which basically was the key element determining the entire Russian 
geopolitical discourse towards the Afghanistan crisis. Eventually, the expansion of warfare 
in Afghanistan propelled reciprocal cooperation between NATO and Russia, thus the 
overall Russian geopolitical discourse could be scripted the same as NATO – positive. 
Hence, we can argue that the same geopolitical discourse towards the crisis leads to the 
natural cooperation. Russia was deeply concerned about global developments, thereby in 
May 2003 Russia and the rest Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) member 
states established special institutions for fighting terrorism. The same Russia’s geopolitical 
discourse led to the reflection and duplication of NATO “practical and formal geopolitics,” 
when Russia had sought to create similar institutions as NATO already had had it. 
 
However, from the inception of the Afghanistan crisis in 2001, the contemporary 
Russian geopolitical discourse towards Afghanistan has changed as well. Despite the fact 
that NATO constantly seeks accommodation with Moscow, Russia with its “current 
nationalistic and assertive mood, and with its opposition to core NATO policies, may not 
desire a truly cooperative partnership.”133 One the one hand, it illustrates how the entire 
geopolitical culture could influence other international actors (changes in the Russian status 
apparatus, identity, etc. also shaped NATO’s geopolitical discourse), on the other hand it 
also presents that the single fixed event/issue does not determine the geopolitical discourse 
in contemporary Afghanistan. Thus, the Russian geopolitical discourse was also shaped by 
the previous military crises in Kosovo and Libya.  
Professor Boris Barkanov from Harvard University believes that Russia has mixed 
feelings towards contemporary Afghanistan: “On the one hand, Russia is concerned about 
security in Afghanistan and Islamic fundamentalism.”134 Afghanistan is situated next to the 
Central Asia region which is a traditional Russian sphere of interest. Consequently Russia 
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has always been deeply concerned about the situation on the ground in Afghanistan. 
Historical experiences, regional interest and geographic range naturally influence the 
Russian geopolitical tradition and its geopolitical discourse towards Afghanistan. During 
the interview, the Senior Counselor Denis Gonchar from the Russian Embassy in 
Washington D.C. acknowledged that the situation in Afghanistan is disturbing and 
destabilizing the whole region. Besides, “Russia [has] concerns about the huge flow of 
drugs from Afghanistan to Central Asia and Russia; Terrorism is another problem that 
makes us [the Russians] to worry.”135  
Despite mutual disputes and different geopolitical discourses in Europe, from 2010 
Russia has provided non-military support to NATO’s mission in Afghanistan.136 However, 
Russia’s cooperation with NATO is based only on pragmatic interests. A major point of the 
Russian geopolitical discourse is Afghanistan’s role as a producer and exporter of opium. 
Currently Russia wants to see ISAF working “on drugs issues, natural disasters and invest 
more money to the Afghanistan security.”137 Nevertheless, ISAF has chosen a policy of 
least resistance on opium growing, because it could drive indigenous Afghanis to an armed 
resistance against the rest of the NATO troops in Afghanistan. Consequently, it influences 
the Russian geopolitical discourse, which is not satisfied with NATO’s geopolitical 
discourse in Afghanistan. Thus Russia seeks to further intensifying international efforts 
under the auspices of the UN aimed at helping Afghanistan and its neighboring states to 
meet these challenges.
138
 Hence, the same issues gravitates Russia to the cooperation and 
more pragmatic geopolitical discourse with NATO.  
“On the other hand, they [the Russians] are not happy about a long term American 
presence in Afghanistan.”139 Russia seeks to promote CSTO’s role as the key partner for 
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NATO in developing a regional approach towards Afghanistan. These divisions and 
rivalries might intensify after 2014, as Russia together with other Central Asian countries 
seek to restore and strengthen close ties with ethnic Tajik and Uzbek warlords.
140
 
Eventually, Russia could try to stop the potential expansion of the Taliban’s activities 
towards Central Asian borders after the NATO troops withdraw from Afghanistan after 
2014.  
Currently Russia is working on two geopolitical discourses towards Afghanistan 
and NATO’s presence there. First of all, Moscow does not fully reject the presence of 
NATO forces in Afghanistan. If CSTO together with Russia might secure the external 
borders of Afghanistan, then NATO could still monitor internal security, but with one 
obligation – the forthcoming ISAF mission must be based on a UN SC resolution and UN 
mandate. And secondly, both Russia and even China have attempted to get guarantees from 
Afghanistan’s government that NATO, especially the U.S., does not establish a long-term 
military presence in Central Asia as “a prerequisite for their input into the region-led 
stabilization programme.”141 Such a dichotomy in the Russian geopolitical discourse could 
be explained by the uncertainty in the contemporary Afghanistan. The Russian “practical 
and formal” geopolitics are tend to wait until the end of the year 2014.  
However, in light of the Russian “popular geopolitics”, it is more likely that the 
second case might appear as the most acceptable. Already in December 2013 Kommersant 
announced that “following the discussion [between NATO’s and Russian representatives], 
it became clear that the parties fundamentally disagree on projections about what awaits 
Afghanistan after the withdrawal of the main body of the foreign contingent in 2014.”142 
Besides that, Kommersant also notices the pessimistic Russian geopolitical discourse 
towards Afghanistan after the withdrawal of NATO forces. Russian officials believe that 
contemporary Afghanistan soon will face unstable scenarios: “the return of Taliban to 
power, a civil war, or the division of spheres of influence between the Taliban and the 
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current regime.”143 A similar opinion could be also observed in other Russian newspapers 
such as Izvestia, Lenta or Pravda which constantly reflect Moscow’s “formal and practical” 
geopolitics towards contemporary Afghanistan. Regarding the past experiences in 
Afghanistan and contemporary issues with NATO in Europe (the Ukrainian crisis), it is 
uncertain that Russia will seek to stabilize potential future threats in Central Asia or expand 
its political influence inside Afghanistan after the 2014 withdrawal of ISAF.  
Consequently, the overall Russian geopolitical discourse in contemporary 
Afghanistan could be described as – neutral. Russia depends on NATO’s activities and the 
influence of the geopolitical discourse in the contemporary Afghanistan. Besides, the 
contemporary issues in Europe complicate the Russian geopolitical discourse towards 
Afghanistan. Moreover, knowing that NATO’s geopolitical discourse is scripted as 
negative in the contemporary Afghanistan, it is unlikely to see the mutual cooperation 
between both sides as it was in the beginning of the Afghanistan crisis in 2001. 
4.2.3. The Libyan crisis 
Last, but not least, the crisis in Libya is NATO’s final military operation that will be 
analyzed in this research. When in March 2011, NATO launched an air strike campaign 
against the Gaddafi regime, several particular features in the Russian geopolitical discourse 
towards the Libyan crisis emerged.  
On the one hand, Russia’s “formal geopolitics” constantly accused and blamed 
NATO of overstepping UN SC resolution 1973 and launching air strikes against Libya. A 
few days after NATO began Operation Unified Protector, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of the Russian Federation issued a press-release in which Russia “strongly believes that it is 
unacceptable to use the mandate derived from UN SC resolution 1973, the adoption of 
which was quite an ambiguous step, in order to achieve goals that go far beyond its 
provisions, which only provide for actions for the protection of civilians.”144 Besides, as it 
was already mentioned regarding the French military supplies to the insurgents, Russia 
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criticized NATO for violating UN SC resolution 1970 which was intended to impose an 
arms embargo on Libya.  
Nevertheless, the Russian “formal and practical geopolitics” sought to become a 
mediator in the Libyan crisis and together with NATO join a campaign to implement the 
UN SC resolution. However, NATO’s “formal and practical geopolitics” were orientated 
on a unilateral decision to solve this crisis with air strikes, thus the Russian geopolitical 
discourse was not acceptable for NATO.
145
 One month after NATO launched the air strike 
campaign, Russia was still not accepted into “the UN SC resolution 1973 club” where only 
NATO and its partners were participating in the intensive bombing campaign. Russia was 
seeking to resolve this conflict peacefully, not because Russia was deeply concerned about 
the civilian casualties and human rights, which are not always recognized in Russia, but 
because of pragmatic reasons. Few years before the Arab Spring, Russia agreed with the 
Gaddafi regime to sign bilateral economic agreement where Russia would cancel all Libyan 
debt in return for the possibility of Russian business companies to develop the Libyan 
civilian infrastructure and build railroads, factories, etc.  
Besides, the Russian “formal and practical geopolitics” sought cooperation with 
NATO due to the expectations that it might lead to the “club” of the international 
community, which dictates the international order. Eventually, the rejections from NATO’s 
side caused the counter reaction from the Russian geopolitical discourse, which turned out 
as negative.  
Further, Vladimir Putin, the key figure of the Russian “practical geopolitics”, 
appeared as a sharp critic of NATO activities in Libya. The “popular geopolitics” quoted 
his official statements and in comparison with the “practical geopolitics” (the official 
statements), were even more rigorous. Vladimir Putin harshly condemned the NATO air 
strikes on Libya; he argued that no one has the right to punish Moammar Gaddafi without 
trial; that the country's whole infrastructure was being destroyed, and in essence one of the 
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warring sides was attacking the other under the cover of aircraft.
146
 Vladimir Putin was 
only one of the Russian officials who criticized NATO so strictly and more often than, for 
instance, Dimitri Medvedev, President of Russia at that time. It ones again approve that 
despite the different crises, the Russian geopolitical discourse is synchronized to each 
other, especially the “popular geopolitics,” which does not influence the entire geopolitical 
discourse, but merely serve as the reflection of the Russian “practical geopolitics.”  
On the other hand, the Russian geopolitical discourse was not essential, because 
according to the Senior Counselor Denis Gonchar from the Russian Embassy in 
Washington D.C “Libya it is not so strategically important to Russia.”147 In addition, 
Russia was more concerned about the UN SC rather than Libya itself, “because no one 
cooperated with them (the Russians) in UN SC.”148 Unilateral geopolitical decisions of 
NATO and solo implementation of the UN SC resolution 1973 once again excluded Russia 
from crisis management and cooperation. Others argue that Dimitri Medvedev simply did 
not care as much and consequently had some disputes with Vladimir Putin. Ultimately, 
Russia saw this conflict in terms of its impact on NATO, when involvement of the Alliance 
in another Arab country could increase anti-NATO, anti-American sentiments and weaken 
NATO’s military capabilities during the economic crisis. As a result, Russia could increase 
its geopolitical discourse towards the European NATO member states, and eventually 
strengthen its pro-Arab diplomacy. 
In overall, Russia was influenced by NATO’s geopolitical discourse towards crisis 
in Libya. Undoubtedly, the Russian geopolitical discourse could be emphasized as 
negative. The independence of Kosovo and NATO’s ongoing unilateral decisions in the 
international arena became a challenge for Russia. Different NATO’s and Russian 
geopolitical discourses towards the same crisis suggest that both parties are tend to rival 
against each other than cooperate. For instance, after the Libyan crisis, Russian tried to 
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oppose other NATO’s unilateral decisions in Syria, which appeared as the potential ‘Libya 
2’ scenario. For a certain time, Syria became the land of a proxy war, where Russia was 
supporting the Syrian government and NATO was sponsoring the opposition groups. 
This chapter reviewed and analyzed how NATO and Russia scripted crises in 
Kosovo, Libya and Afghanistan and how it led to reciprocal accruing disagreements and 
cooperation. The next final chapter will briefly operationalize the outcome of NATO’s and 
Russian geopolitical discourses and present how certain events and decisions led to mutual 
disagreements and cooperation.   
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5. The Interaction of Geopolitical Discourses 
Now it is the time when we must recall that for the most part of this research we are 
not looking at fixed outcomes of events, but rather at ongoing processes. This research 
suggests that attention to long lasting processes could help to realize how international 
actors create and recreate regional or global politics and how their different geopolitical 
discourses of crises have led to reciprocal accruing disagreements and cooperation (at this 
research between NATO and Russia). The previous sub-chapter briefly presented the 
changes in the international order which have been influenced by certain NATO’s and 
Russian geopolitical discourses. The table below recapitulates evaluations of NATO’s and 
Russia’s geopolitical discourses towards Kosovo, Libya and Afghanistan crises in the 
previous 15 years. It provides an opportunity to look at NATO’s military operations and 
realize how it shaped relations with the Russian Federation. 
Table Nr. 5 NATO’s and the Russian geopolitical discourses towards crises 
 
Source: made by the author regarding research. Discourse towards crises: 
5 – very positive; 4 – positive, 3 – neutral; 2 – negative, 1 – very negative.  
Red color – Russia; Blue color – NATO;  
With respect to NATO’s geopolitical discourse there are several significant changes 
towards crises. After the Cold War NATO expanded military operations beyond its borders 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Kosovo 1999 Afghanistan post-
2001 
Kosovo 2008 Libya 2011 Afghanistan2014 
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and as a result in the last 15 years NATO participated in conflicts on three different 
continents in its natural sphere of interest – Europe, then Africa and Asia. However, this 
research suggests that according to geopolitical discourses the performance of NATO 
forces has been gradually decreasing and debates about NATO as the global policeman or 
successful crisis manager are uncertain. 
In the last 15 years NATO defense spending has been gradually reduced, 
consequently, the military capabilities of the Alliance steadily decreased as well. 
Additionally, NATO’s operation in Afghanistan has absorbed a large proportion of the 
Allies’ capabilities for more than a decade.149 Brookings, in its annual report suggests that 
if “the defense spending continues to decline, NATO may not be able to replicate its 
success in Libya in another decade.”150 At this moment only three out of 28 NATO member 
states satisfy 2% GDP spending for the defense. Reduction of military spending was one of 
the reasons why the success of the crisis resolution shifted from very positive (Kosovo) to 
neutral (Libya) and ultimately to negative (contemporary Afghanistan).  
In addition, the deficiency of political consensus within NATO (lack of cooperation 
in the “practical” geopolitics) was another essential reason that led to the effectiveness of 
NATO as a political structure. Though NATO’s command and control (the “formal 
geopolitics”) was working effectively during crises, however, in terms of the political 
decisions the division between the coalition of the willing (mostly the US or France with 
the UK) and the rest of NATO member states has constantly increased. Ultimately, at 
home, NATO societies’ disagreement was gradually rising towards performance in 
overseas missions. The “popular geopolitics” did not serve to NATO’s interest, in 
comparison with Russian geopolitical discourses, at particular crises NATO’s “popular 
geopolitics” did not always reflect “formal and practical geopolitics”, it had more often 
criticized and opposed them. For instance, in 2013 The German Marshall Fund of the 
United States did a survey which found that in mostly all NATO member states the 
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disapproval of an intervention in Syria was more than 60%.
151
 NATO’s dubious victory in 
Libya and the long-lasting war in Afghanistan suggest that similar future expeditions are 
questionable and unlikely to happen. 
How it was already mentioned in the theoretical part (see page 18), regarding 
NATO’s past historical events and new global severities, geopolitical traditions could be 
distinguished as ‘Euro-Atlantic collective defence’ and ‘crisis manager’. However, in the 
last 15 years, NATO’s geopolitical tradition ‘crisis manager’ has turned out as ineffective 
and eventually unsuccessful. Besides, NATO military interventions influenced it relations 
with the Russian Federation.  
 
In the case of the Russian geopolitical discourses there were some essential changes 
towards crises. If during the 1999 Kosovo crisis there was a zero-sum game, when the 
victory of NATO was the defeat of Russia, then after the 9/11 attacks Russia engaged in 
closer cooperation with NATO for the first time. On the one hand it was influenced by the 
new Russian geopolitical culture, which was shaped by the president Vladimir Putin, but on 
the other hand the threat of terrorism demanded more pragmatic relations between Russia 
and NATO.  
Regarding the European issues, the independence of Kosovo marked a new shift in 
Russian geopolitical tradition towards Europe and cooperation with NATO. Kosovo’s 
independence was the breaking point when relations between NATO and Russia started to 
change to more negative rather than positive. Before that, disputes between both sides were 
constantly increasing due to NATO’s active enlargement and attempts to influence Ukraine 
and Georgia. Some could argue that, for instance, issues of contemporary Afghanistan are a 
political platform to improve cooperation between both sides. However, Russia is more 
neutral and pragmatic in this case, whereas on the one hand NATO is leaving the Central 
Asian region and it provides an opportunity to expand Russian influence, but on the other 
hand the uncertainty of Afghanistan’s future worries the Russian officials as well. 
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Undoubtedly, interventions of NATO military forces in Kosovo, Afghanistan and 
Libya have affected Russian foreign and security policies after the Cold War. The dramatic 
changes after 2001 presuppose that in spite of the Kosovo war in 1999, Russia was ready to 
cooperate with the Alliance. The year 2002 was promising for both sides, eventually 
positive reciprocal geopolitical discourses led to the establishment of the NATO-Russia 
Council where decisions and actions were taken by joint agreements. However, NATO’s 
unilateral decisions and specific geopolitical discourses towards crises excluded Russia 
from crisis management in Afghanistan and especially in Kosovo, which at the beginning 
of 2008 declared its independence. The crisis of Kosovo in 2008 dates the end of the 
Russian flexible policy towards NATO and marks a new beginning of a permanently 
hostile policy (the geopolitical discourse) against NATO in Europe. It could be explained 
by several examples.  
First of all, despite the global economic crisis and the fall of oil prices in the period 
of 2008-2010, Russia still gradually increased its military spending from 66 billion dollars 
(2008) to 93 billion dollars (2013), now 40% more than in 2008.
152
  
Secondly, in order to create a counterbalance to NATO, Russia propelled 
negotiations within CSTO. Consequently, Moscow encouraged the creation of the 
Collective Rapid Reaction Force, which was established in 2009, and in 2010 CSTO 
approved the declaration establishing a CSTO peacekeeping force. Such attempts suggest 
that Russia seeks to duplicate NATO’s activities, and eventually if Russia has an 
international peacekeeping force, it could have a legal basis to intervene in crises zones and 
unilaterally resolve conflicts, the same as NATO did in Kosovo, Libya, or Afghanistan.  
Thirdly, different geopolitical discourses could also be revealed by Moscow’s 
official position towards NATO. According to the Russian military doctrine from 2010, 
NATO is the main external threat to the Russian Federation. Furthermore, the research 
suggests that the Russian government subsidizes and controls the majority of media and 
press, thus journals, television and newspapers often promote and reflect a certain 
geopolitical discourse that only serves the Kremlin’s policy which is aimed against NATO.  
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Fourthly, the crises indicate that Europe became the fundamental sphere of interest 
where the Russian geopolitical tradition has shifted dramatically in the last 15 years. With 
less interest and opposition to NATO in other regions Russia concentrates its major 
resources towards European affairs, including the Caucasus region.  
With regard to evidences of this thesis, the hypothesis that different NATO and 
Russian geopolitical discourses towards crises in Kosovo, Libya and Afghanistan have led 
to reciprocal disagreements is only partly satisfied. NATO military interventions in 
Kosovo, Libya and Afghanistan have negatively affected relations with Russia mostly in 
Europe. Mutual cooperation and diplomatic disputes towards crises in Libya and 
Afghanistan are minor in comparison with the NATO-Russian relations in the European 
continent.  
First of all, contemporary disputes in Ukraine prove that Russia is ready to defend 
its geopolitical tradition in the direction of Europe. Secondly, serious Russian geopolitical 
discourses of European affairs (disputes in Kosovo, Georgia, Crimea and Eastern Ukraine) 
suggest that the Russian geopolitical tradition towards Europe is fundamental in 
comparison with other geopolitical traditions (Eurasia or Russia as a bridge between East 
and West). Thirdly, different NATO’s geopolitical discourses with regard to crises led to 
reciprocal accruing disagreements than to cooperation (with only one exception in 
Afghanistan 2001, when reciprocal discourse was the same). And finally, the Russian 
economic and military capabilities are too weak to oppose NATO’s missions in overseas, 
thus Russia will concentrate most of its attention to the geopolitical tradition towards 
Europe.  
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Conclusions 
1. The critical geopolitics turns out as a critique of modern geopolitics. The critical 
geopolitics concentrates on both the relations between states and creation, approval and 
implementation of particular policies or decisions. Gearóid Ó Tuathail’s and Simon 
Dalby’s conceptualization of the critical geopolitics are used as the method of research. 
Every state or agency consist of history, geography, identity, state apparatus and power 
networks, which determine the certain geopolitical tradition. Russia’s geopolitical 
traditions could be named as ‘Russia within Europe’, ‘Eurasian theory’, and ‘Russia as a 
bridge between East and West’ and NATO’s geopolitical traditions as ‘Euro-Atlantic 
collective defence’ and ‘crisis manager.’ Every geopolitical tradition consists of several 
geopolitical discourses which are divided into: “formal geopolitics” (think tanks, strategy 
makers, etc.), “practical geopolitics” (decision makers, official statements, documents, 
strategies and speeches) and “popular geopolitics” (the discourse of the media and 
surveys). All three geopolitical discourses interact and influence each other, thus the lines 
between them could blur. This could be observed at the Russian case, when due to specific 
characteristics of Russia’s geopolitical culture, elements of the geopolitical discourse 
becomes closely related, mostly controlled and monopolized by the “practical geopolitics.” 
In the Alliance case, NATO’s “formal and practical geopolitics” usually cooperate to each 
other, but the “popular geopolitics” often criticizes both of them. The combination of three 
critical geopolitics elements allows determining certain NATO’s and Russian geopolitical 
discourses towards crises in Kosovo, Libya and Afghanistan. 
2. With regard to Kosovo crisis in 1999 NATO’s geopolitical discourse stayed very 
positive, “practical and formal geopolitics” were strongly supported and partly influenced 
by the “popular geopolitics.” As the contrast to NATO Russia scripted this crisis as very 
negative. The active involvement of NATO’s “formal and practical geopolitics” led to the 
limitations and hostility of the Russian decision and strategy makers.  
In 2001, NATO’s geopolitical discourse towards Afghanistan could be explained as 
positive. With the support from the “popular geopolitics”, NATO strategy and decisions 
makers achieved only temporary success in Kabul and its surroundings. The same 
geopolitical discourse could be observed from the Russian side. The expansion of warfare 
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in Afghanistan and the threat of terrorism propelled reciprocal cooperation between NATO 
and Russia. The homogeneous geopolitical discourse united both sides and increased 
mutual partnership.  
However, in 2008 due to lack of consensus within the Alliance, NATO’s 
geopolitical discourse towards the independence of Kosovo appeared as neutral. The 
overall Russian geopolitical discourse turned out as negative. NATO’s “formal and 
practical geopolitics” excluded Russia from the decision making and ignored the Russian 
geopolitical discourse towards the European affairs. Consequently, the Russian geopolitical 
discourse became more hostile and the perception of mistrust towards NATO increased. 
During the crisis in Libya, NATO’s geopolitical discourse was scripted as neutral. 
Even though Gaddafi’s regime was changed, internal disputes within NATO and criticism 
from “popular geopolitics” decreased a whole NATO’s geopolitical discourse to neutral. As 
the contrast to NATO, the Russian geopolitical discourse was negative. Similarly to the 
Kosovo crisis in 2008, Russia was excluded from the decision making in the international 
arena. NATO’s rejection of the Russian geopolitical discourse towards the Libyan crisis 
provoked the counter reaction from Moscow.  
Ultimately, in the contemporary Afghanistan, due to the division within NATO and 
criticism from the media, the entire NATO’s geopolitical discourse could be defined as 
negative. However, Russia’s geopolitical discourse turns out as neutral. One the one hand, 
Russia is deeply concerned about NATO’s issues in contemporary Afghanistan and the 
possible return of Taliban, but on the other hand, due to contemporary disputes in Europe 
Russia does not seek to cooperate with NATO so closely as it did a decade ago. 
3. According to geopolitical discourses the performance of NATO forces has been 
gradually decreasing and debates about NATO as the ‘crisis manager’ are questionable. 
Undoubtedly, NATO’s geopolitical discourses influenced the relations with Russia. 
However, the hypothesis of this research “Different NATO and Russian geopolitical 
discourses towards crises in Kosovo, Libya and Afghanistan have led to reciprocal 
accruing disagreements” is only partly correctly. Russia does not have so much interest 
and it is basically too weak to oppose NATO’s activities around the globe, thus Moscow 
concentrates its attention to its fundamental geopolitical tradition towards Europe.   
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Appendix Nr. 1 
Map Nr. 1. H. J. Mackinder’s The World-Island and the Heartland 
Source: 
http://www.anselm.edu/academic/history/hdubrulle/WWII/WWII2010/text/grading/food/fd
wk05b.htm (accessed Feb 2, 2014) 
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Appendix Nr. 2 
Interview Nr. 1 Interview with the Senior Counselor Denis Gonchar and in the Russian 
Embassy in Washington D.C. (13.02.2014) 
1. What were the Russian perception and discourse after NATO’s invasion in Kosovo 
in 1999? 
In 1999 the invasion of Kosovo was the biggest violation of law. NATO intervention 
violated international law towards Serbians and after bombing Serbia relations between 
Russia and NATO were frozen. 
2. How have the Russian perception and discourse changed after 2008 Kosovo 
declaration of independence? 
Russia still does not recognize an independence of Kosovo. However, we support 
dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo. There must be consensus between both sides and 
Russia is ready to support and mediate negotiations. 
3. What did it mean to the international community? 
The declaration of Kosovo independence has created a precedent when separatist 
regions can act and demand separate autonomies, so it means that they could destabilize 
the sovereign countries. 
4. How have the Russian perception and discourse changed after NATO’s invasion in 
Libya 2011? 
Well, Libya it is not so strategically important to Russia. However, we believe that 
there was misinterpretation of NATO activities during the Libyan crisis, but more 
statements you could find in our official websites. 
5. What did it mean to the international community? 
It simply destabilized the region and the consequences could be observed even now. 
6. What are the Russian perception and discourse in current Afghanistan? 
Situation on the ground is disturbing and destabilized. Russia concerns about the 
huge float of drugs from Afghanistan to Central Asia and Russia. Terrorism is another 
problem that makes us to worry. We think that ISAF must work on drugs issues, natural 
disasters and invest more money to the Afghanistan security. 
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7. What does this case mean to international community? 
Withdraw of NATO ISAF will destabilize the entire region. However, we believe 
that ISAF must stay in Afghanistan, but under mandate of UN. Currently Russia and NATO 
cooperate together and ensure transparent and safe withdraw of NATO troops from 
Afghanistan. We believe that CSTO could work together with NATO, where NATO ensures 
internal stability in Afghanistan and CSTO external security in the region. 
Thank you for your answers. 
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Appendix Nr. 3 
Interview Nr. 2 Interview with Dr. Ieva Karpaviciute, a special Lithuanian attaché to 
NATO HQ (28.02.2014) 
1. What were the Russian perception and discourse after NATO’s invasion in 
Kosovo in 1999? 
Have no information about it. 
2. How have the Russian perception and discourse changed after 2008 Kosovo 
declaration of independence? 
For Russia it was a useful precedent applied in Georgian case 
3. What did it mean to the international community? 
It is kind of precedent and also an important process for a security in the Balkan 
region. 
4. How have the Russian perception and discourse changed after NATO’s 
invasion in Libya 2011?? 
More it was important at UN SC than directly at NATO. RF and NATO did not 
cooperate in Libyan case. 
5. What did it mean to the international community? 
Libyan case for international community was important in context of Arab Spring 
processes as well as MENA regional security and stability. 
6. What are the Russian perception and discourse in current Afghanistan?  
It is good question for Russia, they know better about their perception. Important 
are historical memories for Russian Federation, plus RF is affected by flows of narcotics 
into the country from Afghanistan, as well as ISAF transit and other related issues. 
7. What does this case mean to the international community? 
War in Afghanistan was one of the most important (expensive, in terms of lives and 
expenses, and long-lasting) military operations worldwide. 
Thank you for your answers. 
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Appendix Nr. 4 
Interview Nr. 3 Interview with the senior expert Vadim Volovoj from the Centre of 
Geopolitical Studies (02.03.2014) 
1. What were the Russian perception and discourse after NATO’s invasion in 
Kosovo in 1999? 
In Yeltsin times Russia was weak strategically and it could not play important role 
in the international arena. And of course, Russia understood that they cannot give any 
strong response to NATO. Of course, Russia was against the invasion into the Serbia and 
the Russian troops entering to Pristina was a symbolic try to show that they are also 
important. In the end Russia was still weak and not able to rival against NATO, because of 
internal problems within its own territory.  
2. How have the Russian perception and discourse changed after 2008 Kosovo 
declaration of independence? 
At that time Russia was rather influential in international arena, but still Russia 
could not let itself to rival western countries seriously. The most important thing for Russia 
is ‘near abroad’ and Kosovo was the periphery of Russian influence. Also, Serbian 
government was not so active to oppose Kosovo’s independence, so Putin did not see 
interest to protect Serbia. But on the other hand, Russia send a clear message to the west, 
that if they tolerate independence of Kosovo than Russia has a full right to do the similar 
things with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
3. What did it mean to the international community? 
International community became divided. In general the independence of Kosovo 
was a question of the western countries prestige in the case of success of military 
intervention. The case of South Ossetia’s independence, western countries did not 
recognize it proving that there is double standards.  
4. How have the Russian perception and discourse changed after NATO’s invasion in 
Libya 2011? 
Crisis of Libya became current Syria which clearly shows Russian perception in 
today’s world. And maybe only the fact of Dimitri Medvedev was that Russia did not to the 
same what it does now in Syria. Then V. Putin was disappointed with D. Medvedev’s 
87 
decision and we could have seen some disagreements between them. Russia learned from 
the mistakes in Libya and Syria became of it reflection.  
5. What did it mean to the international community? 
I would only say from realistic paradigm of international relations that when the 
interest of big states (the US, France and so on) are on the table, they act as they want and 
despite any international law or other factors. And Libya is example of it – when big states 
rule international politics with cynical interest and military power. 
6. What are the Russian perception and discourse in current Afghanistan?  
I would say that for this moment the main purpose of Russia in Afghanistan is 
stability, even though the US ensures now it. However, Russia is not happy knowing that 
the US is in the region for too long, because Central Asia is Russian tradition sphere of 
interest. On the other hand, Russia knows that without the presence of the US in 
Afghanistan Taliban could come back to power and destabilize whole region. 
7. What does this case mean to the international community? 
It is still painful situation and NATO’s societies, especially Americans, are tired of 
the military operation, but they understand that leaving Afghanistan right now is not the 
best option. But for NATO countries the situation in their societies is more important than 
stability in Afghanistan, because Afghanistan is not so close to NATO member states. Of 
course, we could also speak about stability as a broader definition, when instability in one 
place affects other places. Anyway, even though countries pay lots of attention to economic 
issues, the US is seeking to keep some military bases in Afghanistan as an influence tool in 
the region.  
Thank you for your answers. 
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Appendix Nr. 5 
Interview Nr. 4 Interview with Professor Boris Barkanov, Postdoctoral Research Fellow at 
Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies at Harvard University (05.03.2014) 
1. What were the Russian perception and discourse after NATO’s invasion in 
Kosovo in 1999? 
I think there was a very broad consensus among Russians, both: between the public and 
the elite. This was kind an aggression of Western countries and was seen as not a 
legitimate.  
2. How have the Russian perception and discourse changed after 2008 Kosovo 
declaration of independence? 
It did not change so much. It became actually an opportunity for Russia to do the same 
claims in Abkhazia, South Ossetia.  
3. What did it mean to the international community? 
In pro-Russian countries anti-NATO mood was rising, but simultaneously in Western 
countries Kosovo was seen as an expression of people will.  
4. How have the Russian perception and discourse changed after NATO’s invasion in 
Libya 2011? 
I think the Russians focused on how operation in Libya exceeded the UN SC resolution. 
Specifically they say that it must be non-fly zone but not bombing of troops and ground 
installations. And also it made Russia more skeptical because no one cooperated with 
them in UN SC. Finally, some would say that Medvedev did not even care about the 
conditions in Libya.  
5. What did it mean to the international community? 
For different international communities it had different meanings. It is hard to see one 
international community’s perception. 
6. What are the Russian perception and discourse in current Afghanistan?  
I think that Russia has mixed feelings and different groups that emphasize different 
things. I think on the one hand, Russia is concerned about security in Afghanistan and 
Islamic fundamentalism. On the other hand, they are not happy long term American 
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presence in Afghanistan Central Asia, so it goes to both directions: they try to deal with 
securities issues, but they do not want to see NATO staying their longer. 
7. What does this case mean to the international community? 
There are security problems what is happening in Afghanistan. It is also the failure of 
western power when ambitious agenda was not accomplished. The big picture we see is 
an expansion of NATO power, and now it coming back, decrease.  
Thank you for your answers. 
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Appendix Nr. 6 
Map Nr. 2 NATO northern transition supply roads to Afghanistan 
 
Source: http://www.stratfor.com/sample/analysis/geopolitical-calendar-week-april-7-2014  
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Appendix 7 
Table Nr. 6 Casualties of NATO forces in Afghanistan 
 
Icasualties.org, The list of the NATO forces casualties in Afghanistan; Source: 
http://icasualties.org/oef/ (accessed March 10, 2014) 
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